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ARTICLES  
Managing Terrorism 
Fionnuala Nı ´ Aola´in* & Colm Campbell** 
Legal analysis of the now much maligned “war on terror” has been a growth 
industry in the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere since the events  
of September 11, 2001.1 A substantial literature spanning multiple legal systems 
has emerged to address its scope, nomenclature and consequences. How best to 
respond to and regulate terrorism remains a contested debate intellectually and 
practically. Modeling  of  various  forms  pervades  the field.  For example,  some 
scholars and policy makers employ a “business as usual” counter-terrorism model 
critiquing reliance on exceptional procedures when dealing with violence and in- 
surgency.2 This model assumes the sufficiency of the ordinary law to cope with 
challenges  posed  by violent  actors  and  other  security  threats.  But  most models 
assume that exceptional legal powers will be adopted to address terrorism, and ex-
plicitly or implicitly depict this adoption in terms of some form of norm-exception 
continuum. Sustained debates pervade both legal scholarship and practice on the 
acceptance of exceptional (anti-terrorism) norms as lawful and legitimate coun-
terpoised with trenchant views on exceptional norms as characterized or defined 
by lawlessness. 3 Such  debates, scholarship  and analysis  are regularly  based  on 
supposition rather than empirical knowledge or testing. 
* Fionnuala Nı ´ Aola´in is University Regents Professor & Robina Chair in Law, Public Policy and 
Society at the University of Minnesota Law School, and Professor of Law at the Transitional Justice 
Institute, Ulster University, Northern Ireland. We note our thanks to Ita Connolly for her research work 
on  the empirical  aspects  of  this  project.  We  thank  Ami  Hutchinson,  Jesse Goldfarb  and  Amanda 
McAlister for research assistance. Comments by Professors Clive Walker and Louise Mallinder were 
helpful in the revisions of this article. All remaining faults lie with the authors.  © 2018, Fionnuala Nı ´
Aola´in* & Colm Campbell. 
**  Professor Colm Campbell  is  an  Emeritus  Professor  at  the Transitional  Justice  Institute, Ulster  
University.  
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Security  argumentation significantly  based  on  supposition  raises  important 
questions as to whether the underpinning assertions in the national security sphere 
are normatively justifiable. Recognition of such lacunae tends to highlight other 
gaps—specifically  that claims  about  the  effectiveness of particular exceptional 
powers also tend to rely upon  normative assertions that they “ought to work,” 
unsupported by verifiable data.  Data  gaps abound in national  security  debates, 
and in legal contestation about whether anti-terrorism regulation is effective or 
necessary. This article dives into that empirical gap by providing unique data on 
the operation of detention, arrest, and trial regimes created to counter and manage 
terrorism in the United Kingdom. While the data is specific to the regulation of 
terrorism in the United Kingdom, we claim that our analysis is useful and applica-
ble to the regulation of terrorism by other democratic states, including the United  
States. We have chosen to focus on democratic states because we do not assume 
the replicability of these finding to non-democratic states, where the pull to legal-
ity is not present in the same way, nor the pressure points both external and inter-
nal comparable. 
Emergencies  and national  security  needs  present  unique challenges  to  data- 
gathering by empirical legal researchers; to state the obvious, few countries per- 
mit outsiders’ presence during waterboarding. But, if data on interrogation prac-
tices and on exceptional courts’ operation can be obtained, they offer a route to 
evaluating claims about the nature and form of the norm-exception relationship. 4 
See John  Ferejohn  & Pasquale  Pasquino, The  Law  of  Exception:  A Typology  of  Emergency  
Powers, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 210 (2004). For recent applications of these relationships, see I NT’L FED’N  
FOR  HUMAN  RIGHTS  (FIDH), France: International Fact-Finding Mission Report, Counter-Terrorism  
Measures and Human Rights, When the Exception Becomes the Norm (June 2016), https://www.fidh. 
org/IMG/pdf/report_counter_terrorism_measures_human_rights.pdf.
Moreover, such data offer a means to appraise critical assumptions that pervade 
national  security  discourses  concerning  the  efficiency,  necessity,  and rationale 
for certain forms of macro- and micro-regulation. Courts and custodial settings 
are particularly important sites in which the state and non-state actors engage in 
what Charles Tilly called the “repertoire of contention.” 5  The contestation spans 
legitimacy, lawfulness, lawlessness, efficiency and human rights-based compli- 
ance in court and interrogation practices. In the “state of justice” (rechtsstaat), 
the ideal frequently  invoked  by  democratic  states while  countering  terrorism, 6 
this  contention  is  certain  to involve legal claims-making  by multiple  actors  in  
myriad ways.7 We examine both the political and the legal dynamic of contention 





5.  CHARLES TILLY, REGIMES AND REPERTOIRES 30–59 (2006). 
6.  The notion of “rechtstaat” derives from a doctrine in continental European legal thinking which 
originated in German jurisprudence. The closest translation into English is “a state based on the rule of 
law.”  See  NEVIL  JOHNSON,  STATE  AND  GOVERNMENT  IN  THE  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY:  THE  
EXECUTIVE AT WORK 13 (2d ed. 1983).  
7.  See Colm Campbell  &  Ita Connolly, Making  War  on  Terror? Global  Lessons  from  Northern 
Ireland, 69 MOD. L. REV. 935 (2006).  
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If trial in the special/exceptional/terrorist court amounts to a contest with the 
state, it is also likely to be a site of interaction and perhaps contestation between 
the open state (typified by the law-based conventional court), and the secret state 
(typified by intelligence gathering, interrogation, rendition, and related practices). 
The secret state is likely to be involved in the process that led to the defend-
ant’s arrest (through electronic or personal surveillance, or recruiting and oper- 
ating  informers);  in  the  interrogation  of  the  suspect  (whether  by  conducting 
interrogations or by briefing interrogators); and in the trial process when there 
is an attempt to rely upon or to discredit evidence obtained from intelligence 
sources. While the nature of the secret state makes it a virtually impossible sub-
ject of direct legal research, its operation may nevertheless leave legal traces  
(for instance, the arrest of a terrorism suspect at home at 4 a.m., has a high 
probability of  being intelligence-reliant). Assembling  and triangulating  such 
traces may allow one to construct the elements of the secret state’s operation. 8 
As  such,  we  can explore  the relationship  between  the law  and violent  (and 
other) challengers, assess the claims of the state for particular kinds of legal 
powers  for  specific  kinds  of  security challenges,  and explore  the  extent  to 
which law is present, absent, or muted in the national security arena. Our arti-
cle  offers  some preliminary  roadmaps  on  how  the  intersection  of empirical 
legal analysis with contextual framing reveals the complex interplay between  
the open and secret state, giving a unique insight into the operation of counter- 
terrorism practices illustrated through detention and trial processes. 
Part I of this article addresses the challenges and specificity of obtaining reli-
able  data  on  terrorism,  and outlines  the  features  and  practice  of  the  United 
Kingdom’s  anti-terrorist  apparatus, specifically  the  arrest,  detention,  and trial 
regimes used to manage terrorism from the late 1970s to the present day. Here we 
explore  the overlap  between  terrorism  management  systems  in  the  United 
Kingdom with parallel structures in other democracies, addressing the core ten-
sion between a law-enforcement model and a counter-insurgency model during 
arrest, interrogation, and trial. Drawing directly on our dataset of terrorist trials, 
Part II of the article takes a close look at who is being arrested and processed for 
trial. We are particularly interested in the profile of defendants charged with ter- 
rorist offenses, and we offer a number of counter-intuitive insights which speak 
directly to issues of profiling and mobilization for politically-motivated violence. 
Part III closely examines arrest patterns, paying careful attention to which actors  
are undertaking arrest, and how these actors change over time, thereby tracking 
the move from militarization to crime-enforcement strategies in the management 
of terrorist challengers. Part IV takes us to the interrogation room, where we use 
our data to glean fresh insights into the tensions that surface between legality and  
counter-terrorism  management  in  the  encounter  between  the  detainee  and  the 
interrogator. Legality is engaged by the formalities of arrest and the potential to 
be charged with a specified crime; counter-terrorism management is invariably  
8.  See Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 84–86 (2010).  
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present from the opportunities to gather intelligence (as opposed to trial useful) 
information, to convince a detainee to cooperate and collude with the state as an 
informer, and because of the ever-present danger of ill-treatment to elicit infor-
mation about impending terrorist attacks which a detainee is unwilling or unable 
to give that information freely. Here we illustrate the increased juridification of  
the interrogation encounter over time, a phenomenon we characterize as the inev-
itable consequence of managing terrorism through law in a democracy. Access to 
lawyers is the focus of Part V, where our data points to a strained relationship 
between access to counsel and the goals of the interrogation process. Uniquely, 
we track the concentration of confessional evidence by detainees and project the 
legal significance of early access to lawyers, as well as the paucity of empirical 
evidence for late confessions, undermining state arguments for extended deten-
tion. Part VI explores the dynamics of confession under interrogation for terrorist 
detainees, giving rich detail on the tensions that invariably surface between legal-
ity demands and counter-insurgency imperatives. Our conclusion brings together  
the  themes  of  terrorism  management,  juridification,  and  the  exposed  tensions 
between legality and counter-terrorism that manifest through the data presented. 
Above all else, the data affords a rare insight into the sealed world of terrorism- 
related interrogation and arrest in democracies, undoing presumptions and allow- 
ing some sacred cows to be demystified.  
I. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN THE CONTEXT OF TERRORISM 
This article examines some of these issues using original empirical data focus-
ing  on pre-trial  stages  in  Northern Ireland’s “Diplock”  court  process. Diplock 
courts were non-jury exceptional courts established to try scheduled (or terrorist 
offenses)  in  1972  as  the  conflict  in  Northern Ireland escalated  and  the  courts  
became a centerpiece of state conflict management strategies. The data addressed 
here cover the time period 2000–2001 of the United Kingdom’s military, politi-
cal,  and legal  engagement  with paramilitary  actors  and  groups, following  the 
signing  and implementation  of  the  Good  Friday  Agreement, also called  the 
Belfast Agreement, in 1998. 9  We concentrated on this time period because prior 
empirical work by Boyle, Hadden, Hillyard, and Walsh has illuminated signifi-
cant patterns in the operation of non-jury courts from the early 1980’s onwards, 10 
and we sought to explore post-peace process data on the practice of detention, 
interrogation, and trial in Northern Ireland. Thus, this work, using the same broad 
data analysis and coding form builds on and extends previous empirical research 
on exceptional courts in Northern Ireland. From the mid-1970s onwards, Diplock 
courts  (so called  because  their  creation followed  a  recommendation  by  Lord  
9.  Agreement  Reached  in  the Multi-Party  Negotiations,  UK–Ir.,  Apr.  10,  1998,  37  I.L.M.  751 
[hereinafter Good Friday Agreement]. Such groups included the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Irish 
National Liberation Army (INLA), and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF).  
10.  See,  e.g.,  KEVIN  BOYLE,  TOM  HADDEN  &  PADDY  HILLYARD,  LAW  AND  STATE:  THE  CASE  OF  
NORTHERN IRELAND (1975) [hereinafter LAW AND STATE].  
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Diplock, a senior British judge), 11 occupied a place of pride in British security 
strategies in Northern Ireland. The state’s decision to utilize a criminal enforce-
ment strategy in tandem with ongoing military containment strategies to address 
the challenge of violent contenders is one that has been mirrored by other democ- 
racies both pre- and post-September 11, 2001.12 
Instituted  under  emergency legislation, 13  the  status  and  procedure  in  the 
Diplock courts followed that of Belfast’s main criminal court, with five critical 
differences. First, the jury was dispensed with so that a single judge decided 
questions of law and fact. 14  Second, the jurisdiction of the courts was defined 
in terms of “scheduled” offenses; these included typical terrorist-type offenses 
(such  as  possession  of explosives),  but also  other  offenses  –  for  instance 
involving use of imitation firearms – which might be committed either by para-
militaries  or  by  “Ordinary  Decent Criminals”  (ODCs)  –  a  term infamously  
used in contradistinction to “terrorists.”15 Third, the rules on admissibility of 
confessions  were relaxed  so  that  some  confessions  that would ordinarily  be 
rejected  under  existing  common law rules  were  made admissible. 16  Fourth, 
there were wider rights of appeal. 17 Fifth, under the most recent version of the 
Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007, there is an important screen-
ing process by the Director of Public Prosecutions. 18 
In  practice,  the  shift  on  admitting confessional  evidence  was linked  to  the 
creation of three main interrogation facilities (that is, holding centers), the princi-
pal  one  of  which  was located  at Castlereagh  near  the largest  city  in  Northern 
Ireland (Belfast), beginning in the early 1970s. The salient point is that an excep-
tional  system was  created  generating  its  own  dynamics.  This involved  arrest 
and  detention  under exceptional/national  security  powers (typically  under  the 
Prevention of Terrorism Acts (PTA), which allowed up to seven-day pre-charging   
11.  REPORT  OF  THE  COMMISSION  TO  CONSIDER  LEGAL  PROCEDURES  TO  DEAL  WITH  TERRORIST  
ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972, Cmnd. 5185, at 3–4 (UK) [hereinafter DIPLOCK REPORT]. 
12.  The  governments  of  Spain,  Germany,  Canada,  and  others,  for example,  have  combined  the 
efforts of a civil police force with those of military strategies to combat terrorism. See generally  J.R.  
Thackrah, Army-Police Collaboration Against Terrorism , 56 POLICE J. 41, 41 (1983) (noting that during 
the conflict in Northern Ireland, the army functioned as a police force). The use of exceptional courts has 
been a particular feature.  See, e.g., GUANTA´ NAMO  AND  BEYOND: EXCEPTIONAL  COURTS  AND  MILITARY  
COMMISSIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Fionnuala Nı ´ Aola´in & Oren Gross eds., 2013). 
13. Walker,  supra note 1, at 312.  
14.  DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 11. 
15.  This term was memorialized by the Baker Report. T HE SECRETARY OF  STATE FOR  NORTHERN  
IRELAND, REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND (EMERGENCY PROVISIONS) ACT 1978,  
1984, Cmnd. 9222 at ¶ 136 (UK).  
16.  See JOHN JACKSON & SEAN DORAN, JUDGE WITHOUT JURY: DIPLOCK TRIALS IN THE ADVERSARY  
SYSTEM 57-58 (1995).  
17.  See John D. Jackson & Sean Doran, Conventional Trials in Unconventional Times: The Diplock  
Court Experience, 4 CRIM. L.F. 503, 520 (1993). 
18.  Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007, c. 6, § 1 (UK).  
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detention)19  in  de  facto interrogation  centers,  questioning  by  dedicated police 
teams under strong pressure to obtain confessions, and trial in Diplock courts, fre-
quently  based  on  confessions  that  might  otherwise  be inadmissible. 20  Nascent 
overlap between the open and closed state was already evident in the creation of 
the courts and their attendant enabling system. 
Northern Ireland’s ordinary criminal legal system continued to operate in 
parallel, frequently processing comparable numbers of ODCs in jury trials. 21 
Supporting data compiled from centralized database.  See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Northern Ireland 
Courts  and Tribunals  Webpages, http://www.courtsni.gov.uk/en-gb/publications/archivedpublications/ 
pages/default.aspx (dataset on file with author). 
While such defendants would have been arrested and detained under ordinary 
legal powers, these regular powers morphed in the course of the conflict to 
reflect  many  of  the essential  contours  of exceptional  powers,  opening  up 
broad challenges of legitimacy for the exceptional legal regime. Most nota-
bly,  the Criminal  Evidence  (Northern Ireland)  Order  1988 resulted  in  the 
abrogation of the right to silence for paramilitary defendants in the jurisdic-
tion,  and  Northern Ireland’s Police  and Criminal  Evidence  Order  1989 
(PACE  (NI))  introduced  four-day  pre-charging  detention (previously only 
forty-eight hours were allowed), 22 and altered rules on admissibility of con- 
fessions.23 The extension of this measure from the exceptional trial of persons 
suspected  of  committing  terrorist  offenses  to  the trials  of  “ODCs”  in 
Northern Ireland, and ultimately to ordinary criminal defendants in England 
is a prime example of a move from the ‘extra-ordinary’ to the ordinary in the  
counter-terrorism context. 
As Diplock courts have shifted from being dedicated vehicles for the trial of 
suspected terrorists into becoming part of the regular legal system via legislation, 
they bear notable comparison with the most recent generation of U.S. Military  
Commissions.24 Of course, the very point of Diplock was to move away from a 
“war  on  terror” model  and  to criminalize  the  actors  engaged  in politically 
motivated violence, while  the  U.S. Military  Commissions distinctly  (though 
ineptly) embraced the laws of war, and the juridical anchor of the war model for 
the legitimacy of the trials. 25 Importantly, at no point during Northern Ireland’s 
conflict did the authorities deploy non-statutory judicial or quasi-judicial bodies 
19.  The 1974 PTA specifically allowed for up to 48 hours of pre-charging detention, but with the 
caveat that the Secretary of State may extend the detention by up to five additional days. Prevention of  
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions Act) 1974, c. 56, § 7(2) (UK).  
20.  See KEVIN  BOYLE, TOM  HADDEN  & PATTY  HILLYARD, TEN  YEARS  ON  IN  NORTHERN  IRELAND:  
THE  LEGAL  CONTROL  OF  POLITICAL  VIOLENCE 49 (1980) [hereinafter TEN  YEARS]; DERMOT  WALSH,  
COBDEN TRUST, THE USE AND ABUSE OF EMERGENCY LEGISLATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND 100 (1983). 
21.  
22. Police and Criminal Evidence Order (Northern Ireland) 1989. 
23. Clive Walker, The Bombs in Omagh and their Aftermath: The Criminal Justice (Terrorist and  
Conspiracy) Act 1988, 62 MOD. L. R. 879, 883 (1999).  
24.  See Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950t, 948b (2012) (authorizing the 
use of military commissions for “violations of the laws of war, and other offenses . . .”).  
25.  See  Laura  K.  Donohue, Terrorism  and Trial  by  Jury:  The  Vices  and  Virtues  of  British  and 
American Criminal Law , 59 STAN. L. REV. 1322, 1341 (2007).  
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corresponding  to  the  first  generation  of Military  Commissions established  by  
President Bush’s Executive Order on November  13, 2001. The British Govern- 
ment had employed similar non-statutory “military courts” to deal with insurgency 
in Ireland in the early twentieth century. 26 But, in an unheralded warning to the 
Bush-era  experience,  these  bodies  became  so legally entangled  though lawyers 
bringing multiple motions challenging them in the civil courts, 27 that thereafter the 
British abandoned the device. Ongoing challenges in the United States concerning 
the legality, expediency, and fairness of the revised Military Commissions affirm 
that ongoing and unrelenting judicial engagement mirrors the earlier British quag- 
mire with no end in sight.28 Only statutory bodies were deployed in the various  
counter-insurgency  campaigns  that  marked  the  United  Kingdom’s  post-Second 
World War period of decolonization. 29 This meant that once it was decided in the 
early  1970s to employ special courts in Northern Ireland,  it was inevitable that 
they would be statutory in authorization. 30 The only real question was whether one 
judge would sit alone, and if so, whether some system of assessors of fact would 
be employed. As noted above, the simplest option was chosen: one judge with no  
assessors.31 
The  reasons  for  choice  of only  one  judge  seem  to  have  been  not only simplicity  but,  more 
convincingly, security and practicality.  See CLIVE WALKER, TERRORISM AND THE LAW 493–529 (2011) 
(noting there were not enough NI judges to provide more than one judge per trial, and it was seen as 
undesirable to bus in judges from Britain). Note that the Diplock Courts were finally closed in 2007.  See  
NORTHERN  IRELAND  OFFICE,  REPLACEMENT  ARRANGEMENTS  FOR  THE  DIPLOCK  COURT  SYSTEM:  A  
CONSULTATION  PAPER 2  (2006), http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/nio/nio110806diplock.pdf 
(noting  that  “Under  the  programme  of  security normalisation  announced  on  1  August  2005,  the 
legislation underpinning the Diplock system is due to be repealed on 31 July 2007.”).  
The data forming the basis of our analysis covers the post Good Friday/Belfast 
peace Agreement phase of the Diplock system and no parallel or similar database 
is available elsewhere. Focusing on this period has a number of advantages in  
comparative terms. The first springs from its near contemporaneity with the post- 
9/11 terrorism experienced by many states. The United Kingdom moved virtually 
seamlessly from combating the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland 
prior to the peace process, to dealing with IRA splinter groups opposed to the 1998 
peace agreement, to countering al Qaeda-oriented activities in the United Kingdom 
(indeed one such latter case was tried in a Diplock court) to contemporary focused 
ISIS challenges. 32 This is not to suggest that all these violent actors can meaning-
fully be considered a manifestation of the single phenomenon of terrorism—the  
26.  See COLM CAMPBELL, EMERGENCY LAW IN IRELAND, 1918-1925 93 (1994).  
27.  Id. at 64.  
28.  See, e.g., In re Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, 866 F.3d 473 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (per curiam); In  re 
Khadr, 823 F.3d 92, 97 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2016); In re al-Nashiri 791 F.3d 71, 75–76 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  
29. See generally  BRIAN  SIMPSON,  HUMAN  RIGHTS  AND  THE  END  OF  EMPIRE  (2004  ed.  2001) 
(examining the role of human rights in administering new constitutions in the post-colonial era).  
30.  DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 11, 8–9, ¶¶ 12–14. 
31.  
32.  See,  e.g.,  LORD  CARLILE,  REPORT  ON  THE  OPERATION  IN  2001  OF  THE  TERRORISM  ACT  2000  
(2002); id. at Annex H (REPORT ON THE OPERATION IN 2001 OF PART VII OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2000);  
LORD CARLILE, REPORT ON THE OPERATION IN 2002 OF PART VII OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2000 (2002);  
LORD CARLILE, REPORT ON THE OPERATION IN 2002 AND 2003 OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2000 (2004).  
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IRA had quite different targeting policies, structures, and goals from al Qaeda  
and  ISIS,33
Compare TIM PAT  COOGAN, THE IRA 38–47 (Palgrave 2002) (1970),  with Daniel L. Byman, al  
Qaeda’s  M&A  Strategy,  BROOKINGS  INST.  (DEC.  7,  2010), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/al-  
qaedas-ma-strategy/ (discussing the recruitment, organization, and targeting policies of Al Qaeda);  see 
also Peter Taylor, Comparing the Evolution of IS and the IRA , BBC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www. 
bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-32326431 (analyzing  the similarities  between  the rise of  ISIL  and  
the IRA).  
—but  at  a sufficiently  high level  of  abstraction  some  transcending 
issues  surrounding  the  interrogation  and trial  of violent  actors  present  them-
selves. These can then be analyzed though a nuanced, contextual understanding 
of the actors, which is what this article seeks to do. 
The second advantage of analyzing this data springs from the originality of fo- 
cusing on the end phase of states of emergency.34  By emergency, we mean the 
use  of exceptional legal  powers  by  the  state  to  address  a  situation  of  crisis, 
whether economic, political, or social in nature. The United Kingdom exercised  
its  prerogatives  and  derogated  on  a  number  of  occasions  from  the  European  
Convention on Human Rights.35 
See, e.g., Marshall v. United Kingdom, app. No. 41571/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), http://hudoc.  
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-5967; Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 (ser. A) 
(1993); Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. 11 (ser. A) (1988); Ireland v. United  
Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978). 
As one of the authors has explored in depth else-
where,  the  resort  to  derogation  has  been markedly  absent  from  the  United  
Kingdom’s  (and  other  states’)  post-9/11  responses  to  terrorism.36 This article 
allows us to explore arrest and interrogation practice as formal derogation prac-
tice is on the wane. Analysis of the norm-exception relationship has tended to 
focus  on  the initial  trajectory 37—from  norm  to  exception;  our  data  as  demon-
strated in this article allows empirical examination of the opposite trajectory – 
from exception to norm. Using official court records following from access given 
by the Northern Ireland Court Service to the authors that recorded details of inter-
rogation, access to lawyers, and of evidence, SPSS cross-tabulations were gener-
ated  based  on literature  and/or  inductive  reasoning  from  the  data  to  track  the 
process from initial arrest, through interrogation, charging, and trial in the imme-
diate post Good Friday Agreement phase of the conflict in Northern Ireland. 38  A 
key and unique facet of this project is its longitudinal dimension, involving access 
to approximately 400 individual cases of persons tried under national security- 
specific provisions in U.K. law in cohorts from 1988 to 2001. To avoid confusion,  
33.  
34.  See, e.g., Nicole Questiaux (Special Rapporteur), Econ. & Soc. Council (UN ESCOR),  Study on 
the Implications for Human Rights of Recent Developments Concerning Situations Known as States of  
Siege  or  Emergency,  UN  Doc.  E/CN.  4/Sub.  21982/15 (July  27,  1982);  Committee  on International  
Terrorism, International Law Association Paris Conference (1984) , 7 TERRORISM: AN  INTERNATIONAL  
JOURNAL 199 (2008).  
35.  
36. Fionnuala  Nı ´ Aola´in, The Cloak  and  Dagger  Game  of  Derogation,  in  HUMAN  RIGHTS  IN  
EMERGENCIES 124 (Evan J. Criddle ed., 2016).  
37.  See, e.g., ANTONY JENNINGS, JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN NORTHERN  
IRELAND  (1990);  Conor  Gearty, Terrorism  and  Human  Rights:  A  Case  Study  in  Impending Legal 
Realities, 19 LEGAL STUD. 367 (1999); John Jackson, Many Years On in Northern Ireland: The Diplock  
Legacy, 60 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 213 (2009). 
38. Details of methodology are found in Appendix I: Methodology.  
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the data presented in tabular form covers only the 2000–2001 cohorts, but key 
points from the 1988–99 dataset are referenced as relevant in the text. 
Unlike many jurisdictions that have resorted to the use of exceptional courts to 
process terrorist crime, consistent empirical work in Northern Ireland through the 
1970s and 1980s has detailed the patterns and influences on due process rights 
and mechanisms, as the state increasingly relied on the legal process to address 
the challenge of political and terrorist violence. 39 The research strategy in this 
project  sought  to  ensure  that  the methodologies employed  were compatible 
with earlier  studies  of  the Diplock  courts, 40  permitting  future  assessment  of 
their operation over a period of nearly four decades. This unique continuity of 
data and analysis offers an important and under-explored opportunity to assess  
the means by which the democratic state responds to terrorist actors and other 
violent challenges; how rule of law institutions function in such circumstances; 
and to draw broader theoretical conclusions (many counter-intuitive to prevail- 
ing orthodoxies). 
The questions addressed in this article break down into two sets – the specific 
and the conceptual. The specific questions in relation to pre-trial aspects of the 
Diplock court system include:  
＋ Who was interrogated?  

＋ Did they have lawyers present?  

＋ How extensive was the interrogation?  
＋ Did they make confessions, and if so, when?  

＋ Did the lawyers make any difference?  

＋ To what extent were the state’s practices informed by the influence 
of external oversight exercised by international courts and tribunals 
and by the requirements of treaty obligations (requiring any meas-
ures taken to be compatible with human rights norms, or for the state 
to make specific and justified derogations from those obligations)? 41 
The broader conceptual issues that the data set and its analysis raise include:  
＋ What does state practice tell us about the viability of a sealed norm-  
exception antinomy?  
＋ As the emergency declined, was there any evidence of hybridization 
of the normal and the exceptional legal systems?  
39.  See BOYLE, HADDEN & HILLYARD, LAW AND STATE, supra note 10.  
40.  See, e.g., BOYLE, HADDEN & HILLYARD, TEN YEARS, supra note 20. 
41.  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15,  
Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.  
376  JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 9:367 
＋ To what extent can the exception explored here demonstrate where 
law plays a limited or perhaps a dampening role?  
＋ In  the longer  term,  as all  these  data  sets  are analyzed  in  tandem, 
what does a longitudinal study over the entire length of a conflict 
say about the role of legal institutions and the effect of legal culture 
on a state’s resort to exceptional powers?  
＋ What are the implications of our findings for states currently at the 
forefront of the utilization of courts and custodial settings as a means 
to  contain  or  process  terrorist  actors  and  other violent challenges 
and terrorists, notably the United Kingdom and the United States?  
II. DEFENDANTS: WHO WAS TRIED BEFORE THE  DIPLOCK COURTS? 
If interrogation processes and trials are sites of contention between the state  
and non-state actors, examination of the ages and backgrounds of defendants can 
provide a snapshot of sorts of that interaction at a particular moment. This can 
give clues about degrees of radicalization and mobilization of the state’s chal-
lengers, facilitating exploration  of  the complex  interaction  these  are likely  to  
have with the state’s security apparatus.42 It may also offer clues as to how the 
state might respond in multi-dimensional ways to the communities and individu-
als who may have a negative relationship with the state. This dynamic is all the 
more pertinent given state attention to countering and preventing violent extre-
mism, and the elusive search for effective strategies to identify those men (and 
women) most at risk of being radicalized or engaged in politically-motivated vio-
lence.43 Thus, a fundamental component of the defendant profile analysis is the 
extent to which the state’s legal system contributes to or dampens the mobiliza- 
tion of extremists. 
What is striking about the data is that it shows that paramilitary defendants 44 
being charged under national security provisions have gotten significantly older 
over time in the course of the Northern Ireland conflict. In the 2000–2001 study,  
51 percent are 28 years of age and only 27 percent were under 22 years of age  
(Table 1). This typology is true of both Republicans and Loyalists – that is, it cuts  
42.  See TED ROBERT  GURR, WHY  MEN REBEL (1970); Ted Robert Gurr, Why Minorities Rebel: A 
Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict Since 1945 , 14 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 161 (1993) 
(discussing political protest and rebellion by communal groups); Campbell & Connolly,  supra note 7 
(discussing the mobilization of states’ violent challengers).  
43.  See,  e.g.,  HM  GOVERNMENT  HOME  OFFICE,  PREVENT  STRATEGY,  2011,  Cm.  8092  (UK)  
[hereinafter “PREVENT STRATEGY”]; Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act,  
H.R.  1955,  110th  Cong.  (1st  Sess.  2007);  EXEC.  OFFICE  OF  THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES,  
EMPOWERING  LOCAL  PARTNERS  TO  PREVENT  VIOLENT  EXTREMISM  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  (2011) 
(outlining President Obama’s counter-terrorism strategy at a local level). 
44.  A note on terminology – we refer variously in the study to paramilitary actors and also use the 
term ‘terrorism’  as  appropriate, in  part to defer the broader and  more complex engagement with the 
dynamic of multiple actors in the conflict and to eschew the wholesale use of ‘terrorists’ terminology 
that tends to heighten rather than minimize the perceived political import of the analysis.  
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across paramilitary offenders on both side of the political divide. Defendants in 
our  1988  cohort  were  younger,  and  a  study  of  the Diplock  Courts  by Boyle, 
Hadden and Hillyard in the 1970s found 60 percent aged 21 or under. 45 
This  data compliments  the  data analysis  of  “ordinary” criminality,  which 
points to a decline in criminal participation as individuals get older. 46  Here, the 
personal costs of constant engagement with the criminal justice system, the expe-
rience of imprisonment, and the emotional tug from families and communities 
have all been identified as significant elements in prompting behavioral change. 
Why our data has a different hue is a puzzle, which we explain by reference to 
state  conflict  management  strategies  as well social  and psycho-social  aspects 
stemming from the specificity of mobilization to non-state paramilitary groups. 
Whether this pattern holds for all terrorist organizations over time requires further 
empirical analysis.  
Our data is consistent with, but does not prove, the hypothesis that the state’s 
de-escalation of its security strategies from circa 1990 had the effect of curbing 
the kind of cycles of radicalization and violent mobilization evident earlier in the  
conflict.47  In other words, if there was a nexus between state repression and vio-
lence, we suggest that curbing the repression also had the effect of lessening the 
supply of younger recruits to paramilitary groups. This particular point has clear 
contemporary  resonance,  as  pervasive  security  concerns  about radical  recruit-
ment to al Qaeda, ISIS (and other Islamic groups) are shaping security thinking 
and initiatives across multiple spheres (for example, foreign policy and national  
security).48 In  the  United  Kingdom  this  concern  has  sparked multiple policies 
from key government departments, with little indication of its grounding in em-
pirical data. 49 
One  might also  posit  that  the  data  reflects  the  increased  sophistication  of 
paramilitary groups that, given the growing capabilities of state security forces, 
realized  that  the  effective  conduct  of  their  campaigns  required  trained  and  
45.  BOYLE,  HADDEN  AND  HILLYARD,  LAW  AND  STATE,  supra note  10,  at  23 table  3.2, See also , 
Campbell & Connolly  supra note 7, at 358. 
46.  Jeffery T. Ulmer & Darrell Steffensmeier, The  Age  and Crime Relationship Social  Variation, 
Social Explanation , in THE NURTURE VERSUS BIOSOCIAL DEBATE IN CRIMINOLOGY: ON THE ORIGINS OF  
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AND CRIMINALITY (Kevin M. Beaver, J.C. Barnes & Brian B. Boutwell eds. 2015).  
47.  See, e.g., J. BOWYER BELL, THE SECRET ARMY: A HISTORY OF THE IRA 1916–1970 (1970).  
48.  See, e.g., FARHAD  KHOSROKHAVAR, RADICALIZATION: WHY  SOME  PEOPLE  CHOOSE  THE  PATH  OF  
VIOLENCE (Jane Marie Todd trans., 2017); WILLEM KOOMEN & JOOP  VAN  DER PLIGT, THE  PSYCHOLOGY  
OF  RADICALIZATION  AND  TERRORISM (2015); Mary Beth Altier & John Horgan,  The Future of Terrorist 
De-Radicalization  Programs ,  13  GEO.  J.  INT’L  AFF.,  Spring/Summer  2012,  at  83  (2012);  Khouwaga 
Yusoufzai & Franziska Emmerling, How Identity Crisis, Relative Depravation, Personal Characteristics, 
and Empathy Contribute to the Engagement of Western Individuals in Islamist Terrorist  Behavior , 8 J.  
TERRORISM RES. 68 (2017).  
49.  See, e.g., PREVENT  STRATEGY, supra note 43 (detailing the United Kingdom’s counter-extremism 
strategy, including efforts to prevent radicalization); H OME  OFFICE, PREVENTING  EXTREMISM  TOGETHER:  
PLACES  OF  WORSHIP  (2005)  (UK);  HM  GOVERNMENT  HOME  OFFICE,  COUNTERING  INTERNATIONAL  
TERRORISM: THE UNITED KINGDOM’S  STRATEGY, 2006, Cm. 6888 (UK). For an assessment of age (and 
other)  factors  underpinning  the  recruitment  of al  Qaeda  offenders,  see  HANNAH  STUART,  THE  HENRY  
JACKSON SOC’Y, ISLAMIST TERRORISM: KEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS (2017).  
378  JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 9:367 
Table 1. Defendants: Age & Background 2000-2001   
 Age of Defendant     
 19 or under  20–22  23–25  26–27  28 1 Total  
Background    Row %    Row %    Row %    Row %    Row %   Col  %  
Loyalist    14    15%    13    14%    12    13%    8    9%    45    49%    92    72% 
Republican    3    10%    4    13%    6    19%    1    3%    17    55%    31    24%  
Security Forces    0    0%    1    25%    0    0%    0    0%    3    75%    4    3%  
Other (ODC)    0    0%    0    0%    0    0%    0    0%    0    0%    0    0% 
Total    17    13%    18    14%    18    14%    9    7%    65    51%    127    100%  
experienced operatives. We think this is less likely given the finite supply of vol-
unteers to paramilitary organizations and our view that the paramilitary organiza-
tions did not have great capacity to regulate their supply of volunteers. The age 
dimension  is also useful to interrogate assumptions that  pervade scholarly  and 
policy debates concerning the ‘typical’ or average profile (including age) of likely 
offenders with  the  supposition  that the most likely group of men to engage in 
politically  motivated violence  are  young.  This  assumption  has  a  reach  across 
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multiple contexts such as the use of profiling patterns in ‘stop and search’ meas- 
ures,50 and other arenas of direct interface between communities perceived as vul-
nerable to radicalization and the state. 
The data also suggest that mobilization does not age out, and the commitment 
to ideology and to certain political goals is secured in ways that make sustained 
engagement throughout a lifetime a predictable feature. Moreover, individuals in 
our study are located in families and communities that may broadly support and 
solidify  the political  objectives  being articulated,  thereby  providing  sustained 
encouragement to imprisoned or militarily active individuals, in ways that are dis-
tinct and different from regular criminal activity. These communities may also be 
under the most sustained policing and military engagement by the state, compli-
cating  the ‘push-pull’  factors  that lead  to  sustained mobilization  into political 
violence. 
Placing the data in historical context permits us to observe that a fundamental 
shift has occurred in the profile of the average paramilitary offender in Northern 
Ireland. The data relate to a time period in which a major peace agreement (the 
Good Friday/Belfast Agreement) had been signed between the primary protago- 
nists  to  the  conflict,51 though  with considerable  dissention  from  both political 
constituencies – the Loyalist political and paramilitary groupings and dissident 
Republican groups. 52 
A number of groups do not observe a ceasefire status, including the Real IRA which called off its  
ceasefire in 2000. Cf. POLICE SERVICE OF NORTHERN IRELAND, POLICE RECORDED SECURITY SITUATION  
STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT COVERING THE PERIOD 1ST APRIL 2016 – 31 MARCH 2017 (2017), https:// 
www.psni.police.uk/globalassets/inside-the-psni/our-statistics/security-situation-statistics/2017/annual-  
security-situation-statistics-report-2016-17.pdf (discussing  a  rise  in  security  incidents  in  the early  
2000s).  
Yet, the contours of the defendants’ profile follows that of 
changing power relationships following the Good Friday Agreement. Prior to the 
Agreement,  a  majority  of  defendants  had  been Republicans—suspected  IRA  
operatives.53 What is striking about our data set is that Loyalists now outnumber 
Republicans nearly 3:1 in terms of who is being arrested for offenses covered by 
the Prevention of Terrorism Acts. Most of the Loyalist defendants were charged 
with public  order  offenses, generally  those involving  street  protests  and  other 
forms of violent assembly. 54 In general, the context for such public street-based 
50.  In the United Kingdom, for example, the use of Terrorism Act powers to stop and search suspects 
resulted  in  a  dramatic  increase  in  the  ethnic profiling  of  young  minorities.  See  RUNNYMEDE  
PERSPECTIVES, ETHNIC  PROFILING: THE  USE  OF  “RACE” IN UK LAW  ENFORCEMENT 7 (Kjartan Pa´ll 
Sveinsson ed., 2010) (“The massive increase in stop and search recently has – unsurprisingly – affected 
minority ethnic young people to a far greater extent than their white peers.”).  
51.  See  Good  Friday Agreement, supra note  9. For  a comprehensive analysis of the Good  Friday 
Agreement, see Volume 22(4) (1999) of the Fordham Journal of International Law, which features 28 
articles and essays analyzing Northern Ireland’s peace process. 22 F ORDHAM  INT’L L.J. 1136, 1136–  
1906 (1999). See also  LEE  A. SMITHEY,  UNIONISTS, LOYALISTS, AND  CONFLICT  TRANSFORMATION  IN  
NORTHERN  IRELAND  (2011)  (providing  a  case  study  of  the  communities  after  the  signing  of  the  
agreement). 
52.  
53.  Cf. BOYLE, HADDEN & HILLYARD, LAW AND STATE, supra note 10, at 23 table 3.2.  
54. See generally  CAROLYN  GALLAHER,  LOYALIST  PARAMILITARIES  IN  POST-ACCORD  NORTHERN  
IRELAND (2007). Unresolved issues from the Belfast Agreement led to rioting and violence on multiple  
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contestation arose from protests against newly synchronized administrative pro-
visions.  These  measures called  for  the regulation  of religious  and political 
marches in Northern Ireland, an aspect of public political identity most associated 
with Loyalist groups, a manifesto that emerged decisively from the peace pro- 
cess.55 These data point to a transformation in which groups and individuals are 
likely to challenge the state, and counter-intuitively affirm that peace agreements 
may  not  in  fact deliver fully peaceful  outcomes  in  the  short  to  medium  term. 
Rather, spoilers, oppositional organizations and new forms of mobilization may 
be part of the transitional landscape. The legal and political terrain may remain 
complex but in differently textured ways. 
Another notable  point  is  that  the legal  system  in  the  period  under  review 
became  more narrowly  focused  on politically-motivated  offenses.  At earlier 
points in the conflict, one of the major legal criticisms of terrorism legislation and  
its enforcement was directed at the practice of sweeping up persons who were not 
associated with terrorist violence, a practice enabled by the broad definitions of  
crimes contained in the Prevention of Terrorism Acts and the Emergency Powers 
Acts (for example, use of a firearm would automatically define a crime as being  
‘terrorist’ in nature, even if it were used in ordinary crime).56 Moreover, legal 
changes have bolstered this move with successive modifications to both the list of 
scheduled  offenses  and also  discretion  in filtering  out  those  who formally fall 
within the list. 57 This finding is illustrated by the nil return on what have been 
euphemistically termed “ODCs”. In our data, ODCs are not appearing in the non- 
jury court system, hence a 0 percent return. In a relevant 1980 study ODCs were 
appearing in the Diplock courts at a 40 percent rate, 58  and in the 1988 data set,  
ODCs were present at a rate of 20 percent.  
This finding confirmed our intuition that the screening out of ODCs over time 
from the Diplock courts illuminates some of the complexity of the norm-excep-
tional antimony in prolonged emergencies. Specifically, while there are examples 
of hybridization (for example, the abrogation of the right to silence), practice can 
also run in the other direction. There was sustained pressure domestically from 
NGOs and civil society and internationally from human rights bodies to remove 
ODCs from Diplock courts. ODC’s presence in the exceptional legal system was 
a legitimacy challenge for the state, pointing to flawed procedural fairness and to 
the costs of exceptionality for the integrity of the ordinary law. The “fix” was 
occasions.  In  2013,  for example, violence  erupted following  a  decision  to  fly  the  Union Flag  on 
designated days only—as opposed to every day. The resulting Haass-O’Sullivan talks failed to result in  
a consensus. See Gerry Adams, Lessons from the Irish Peace Process, 16 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 218, 218–  
20 (2015).  
55.  Kevin Hearty, The Great Awakening? The Belfast Flag Protests and Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist 
Counter-Memory in Northern Ireland  30 IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES 157 (2015)  
56.  See Dermot Walsh, Erasing  the  Distinction  Between  Anti-Terrorist  and Criminal  Justice 
Measures  in Ireland ,  in  COUNTER-TERRORISM,  HUMAN  RIGHTS  AND  THE  RULE  OF  LAW:  CROSSING  
LEGAL  BOUNDARIES  IN  DEFENSE  OF  THE  STATE 212–237  (Aniceto  Masferrer  & Clive Walker  eds.,  
2013).  
57.  See WALKER, TERRORISM AND THE LAW, supra note 31, at 493–529.  
58.  For data points see WALSH, supra note 20, at 80-82.  
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relatively simple (enabling an effective de-scheduling mechanism). Moreover, the 
narrative of the costs to the individual ODC  defendant  portrayed  the system  as 
opposed to the basic protection of individual liberty, a virtue the democratic state 
was anxious to maintain. Overall, however, one has to view the sealing off of the 
Diplock  system  from  ODCs  as telling only  a partial  story  of norm-exceptional 
antinomy, as other practices from the Diplock courts migrated to the ordinary law,  
even as the cohort of defendants within the system appeared more uniform over  
time.  
III. ARREST  AND  EXCEPTIONALISM  
In our 2000–2001 data set there was, at most, one arrest by the Army or in joint 
Army/Police operations (Table 2). Earlier studies of arrest  patterns undertaken 
during the middle period of the conflict found 11 percent of arrests across both 
categories (solely or jointly by the Army). 59 This data reflects fundamental shifts  
as to which actors are dominating the management of conflict, over the course of 
the life-cycle of conflict space. If military presence in a conflict space generally 
co-relates with the intensive and extra-ordinary phase of conflict regulation, this 
data set again points to the malleability and trajectory of conflict regulation from 
exceptional to regularization. 
In Northern Ireland a politically agreed upon process of demilitarization took 
place after 1998. 60 
See Good Friday Agreement, supra note 9, at Strand Three: Decommissioning. The most recent 
document related  to  the  decommissioning  of military  and paramilitary  weapons  was published  in  
November 2015. See N. IR. EXEC., A FRESH START: THE STORMONT AGREEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION  
PLAN  (2015), https://www.northernireland.gov.uk/publications/fresh-start-stormont-agreement-and- 
implementation-plan-0.
This process included early release of persons serving prison 
terms for crimes defined as “terrorist” (under the PTA or EPA), essentially a de  
jure amnesty,61 as well as an internationally monitored process of demilitarization 
that destroyed significant quantities of weapons and explosive materials. 62 In the 
same context, the deployment of the British army was substantially scaled back, 63 
Operation Banner ended in 2007. The official review is Army Code 71842. Page 7-1 has troop 
numbers  reflected  for  the totality  of  the  conflict.  See  CHIEF  OF  THE  GENERAL  STAFF,  ARMY  OF  THE  
UNITED KINGDOM, OPERATION BANNER: AN ANALYSIS OF MILITARY OPERATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 
(2007), http://www.vilaweb.cat/media/attach/vwedts/docs/op_banner_analysis_released.pdf; see also  
ANDREW SANDERS & IAN S. WOOD, TIMES OF TROUBLES: BRITAIN’S WAR IN NORTHERN IRELAND vi–vii 
(2012) (citing the military levels of engagement during the conflict).
and the police took over and civilianized a range of functions that had, to that  
59.  Id. at 36.  
60.  
 
61.  It is fair to say that the status of release as a form of amnesty is contestable. A de facto amnesty 
occurs typically when nothing is done, no investigations or trials are pursued, the state acts as if the 
crimes did not take place. A de jure amnesty is different as there is a legal framework setting out an 
exceptional decision  not  to prosecute specific  categories of crimes and offenders. The Early Release  
Scheme  may  be  viewed  as  different  again  as  the  beneficiaries  were  convicted,  those  convictions 
remained  on  their  record  and  they  were released  on license. See generally  LOUISE  MALLINDER,  
AMNESTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND  POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: BRIDGING THE PEACE AND JUSTICE  DIVIDE 37 
(2008) (explaining the differences between decisions to grant amnesty).  
62.  See Good Friday Agreement, supra note 49, at Annex B, Prisoners, ¶¶ 1, 5; MALLINDER, supra  
note 61, at 157–58. 
63.  
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point, required close military support. This pattern of handover has some contem- 
porary resonance in Iraq and Afghanistan, though it is worth noting the distinc-
tions that pertain to the higher degree of effective security control in Northern 
Ireland. In Iraq and Afghanistan, British and American forces made local police 
and military  units responsible  for  the front-line  engagement  with  terrorist  
groups,64 
See,  e.g.,  ANTONIA  CHAYES,  BORDERLESS  WARS:  CIVIL  MILITARY  DISORDER  AND  LEGAL  
UNCERTAINTY 25–58 (2015) (discussing the United States Counterinsurgency Strategy and the handover 
of local control of military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan); see also  BUREAU  OF  POLITICAL-MILITARY  
AFFAIRS, DEP’T  OF  STATE, U.S. GOVERNMENT  COUNTERINSURGENCY  GUIDE  (2009), https://www.state.  
gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf (outlining United States military policy related to containing 
and addressing the root causes of insurgent activities in military zones); Travers B. Child,  We Don’t  
Need  No  Education:  Reconstruction  and  Conflict  across  Afghanistan,  HOUSEHOLDS  IN  CONFLICT  
NETWORK (Feb. 2017), http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/HiCN-WP-244.pdf 
(examining the status of the military led reconstructions in Afghanistan and Iraq).
as well  as signalling  a  shift  from external  to internal control  of law  
Table 2. Who Made the Arrests?   
 Arrestor (note: RUC is used for Royal Ulster Constabulary)     
 Uniformed  
RUC Alone 
Plainclothes  
RUC Alone  
Other  Not Known Total  
Defendant  
Background  
Count  Row %  Count  Row %  Count  Row %  Count  Row %  Count  Row %  
Loyalist    55    59.8%    34    37.0%    1    1.1%    2    2.2%    92    72.4% 
Republican    25    80.6%    6    19.4%    0  0%    0  0%    31    24.4%  
Security   
Forces    
0  0%    0  0%    0  0%    4    100.0%    4    3.1% 
Total    80    63.0%    40    31.5%    1  8%    6    4.7%    127    100.0%  
64.  
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enforcement. In practice, this has been much less successful than anticipated, 65 in 
part  because  of  the lack  of  a  comprehensive  and inclusive political settlement 
involving all major political and military factions in both countries. 
The arrest patterns and the primacy of the police in the latter phases of the con-
flict  in  Northern Ireland  demonstrate  an  embedding normality  as  the  system 
moves towards greater formal rationality in its practices. On the one hand this 
may appear as a move away from exceptionality, but the shift to police-led anti- 
terrorism practice must also account for the marked militarization of the police 
over time, a direct result of a militarized conflict. This shift towards formal ration-
ality is also evident from exploring the regimes governing detention. While 63 
percent of persons are arrested (and subsequently detained) under what could be 
termed a counter-terrorist regime, 30 percent are held under the ordinary law pro-
visions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Order, ordinary criminal law in the  
jurisdiction (Table 3).
In parallel with changes to the exceptional regime governing detention (princi-
pally  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism  Acts  (PTAs)  and  the  Northern Ireland  
(Emergency Provisions) Acts (EPAs),66 during the course of the conflict the ordi-
nary law on detention was also recast in a way that brought it more into line with 
the exceptional legal system. Notably, much of this legislation was introduced 
and gained parliamentary approval on the basis that it had specific purview over 
the particular circumstances and challenges of terrorism. In reality, the changes 
had sizeable  effects  on  the  operation  of  the  ordinary criminal  justice  system. 
There are obvious parallels to the Congressional debates concerning the passage  
of the USA PATRIOT Act.67 The ordinary law now provided for 4-day detention   
  
65.  See,  e.g.,  Patrick  Porter, Last  Charge  of  the  Knights?  Iraq,  Afghanistan,  and  the Special 
Relationship, 86 INT’L  AFF. 355, 368 (2010) (citing the infiltration of the al-Sadr militia force in the 
British-trained Basra police force); Seth G. Jones, The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure  
and Jihad, 32 INT’L SEC. Q., Spring 2008, at 7, 17 (explaining the risk of infiltration by insurgent forces 
for local police forces in Afghanistan).  
66.  E.g., The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984, c. 8 (superseded) (UK); The 
Prevention  of  Terrorism  (Temporary  Provisions)  Act  1989,  c.  4 (repealed)  (UK);  The  Prevention  of 
Terrorism (Additional Powers) Act 1996, c.7 (UK); Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1974, 
c. 56 (UK); Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978, c. 8 (UK) (repealed 1991). 
67.  Section 412 of the PATRIOT Act requires that the Attorney General shall detain any alien who is 
suspected  of  terrorism  and  that  the alien  remain  in custody until  he/she  is  removed  from  the United  
States. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept  
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 412, 115 Stat. 272, 350– 
52 (2001). Under the provisions of this section, the Attorney General can decide to continue detaining 
the individual  for  a  period  of  up to  six  months  if  the “release  of the alien will  threaten  the national  
security of the United States.” Id. The provisions in the PATRIOT Act differ from other immigration 
statutes  authorizing  mandatory  detention  because  they  broaden  the  definition  of  terrorism  to include 
anyone who provides material support to an organization if that person knew or reasonably should have 
known  that  their  activity would  support  a  designated  terrorist  organization  or  any  organization  that  
engages in terrorist activity. See id. at §411(a)(1)(F)–(G). This essentially means that anyone who has  
had any connection to a terrorist organization, whether or not they participated in terroristic activities, is 
deportable under the PATRIOT Act. David Cole, Enemy Aliens , 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 967 (2002). This 
broad definition means that any association with a terrorist organization could result in detention and  
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without charge,68 and also introduced new rules for the admissibility of confes-
sions, and for access to lawyers. These restrictions were applied across the board 
on the “right to silence,” the United Kingdom equivalent to Miranda warnings. 69 
Therefore, while the trajectory in this sample is from the exception to the norm,  
that ‘norm’ is one that has been reshaped in a way that to a degree mirrors the 
exceptional.   
Table 3. Arrest Power Used   
 Arrest Power Used     
 
S.14 PTA 1989   
(7-day)  
Art26 PACE (NI) Order  
1989 (4-day power)  
Other  Not known Total  
Defendant  
Background  
Count  Row %  Count  Row %  Count  Row %  Count  Row %  Count  Row %  
Loyalist    57    62.0%    31    33.7%    4    4.3%    0    0%    92    100.0% 
Republican    23    74.2%    7    22.6%    0    0%    1    3.2%    31    100.0%  
Security  
Forces    
0    0%    0    0%    4    100.0%    0    0%    4    100.0% 
Total    80    63.0%    38    29.9%    8    6.3%    1    .8%    127    100.0%  
subsequent  deportation.  Id.  at  966–72.  See,  e.g.,  147  CONG.  REC.  S11,004 (daily  ed.  Oct.  25,  2001)  
(statement of Sen. Leahy). 
68.  The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, § 44 (3)(b) (UK).  
69.  See  Miranda  v.  Arizona,  384  U.S.  436,  444–45  (1966);  T.E.  St.  Johnson, Judges’ Rules  and 
Police Interrogation in England Today , 57 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY  & POLICE  SCI. 85, 86-88 (1964) 
(noting the formation of judicial policy relating to a right to remain silent during police interrogation 
within the Judges’ Rules of 1912 and 1918); The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, §§ 66- 
67 (UK) (directing the creation of codes of practice for police procedures including interrogation);  Reid  
v. Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1, 8 (Austl.).  
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The complexity of two detention regimes operating in parallel, with both feed-
ing into Diplock trials, raises questions of legal hybridity that are explored further 
below. At this point, what can be noted is that ordinary law, specifically PACE 
(NI) provisions are more likely to have been used against Loyalists (23 percent) 
than  against Republicans  (32  percent),  because  the  former  were  more heavily 
involved  in public  order  disturbances. Interestingly,  statistics  in England  and 
Wales follow the same trend. In recent years, most terrorist suspects have been  
arrested under PACE and not the Terrorism Act.70 
See Home  Office,  Operation  of police  powers  under  the  Terrorism  Act  2000  and  subsequent 
legislation:  arrests,  outcomes  and  stops  and  searches, quarterly  update  30  September  2013,  Great  




There may be several reasons 
for this pattern. First, police forces in the United Kingdom mainland may have 
greater familiarity  with  PACE  provisions:  this  is  what  they  use regularly  and  
understand best. Second, there may be uncertainty whether the suspect is a terro-
rist or an ODC, and conservative policing might prefer the ordinary law over the 
exceptional in the context of uncertainty. The third factor may be the unavailabil-
ity of police bail under the Terrorism Act. 71 In sum, these statistics reveal the flu- 
idity of charging practices post-conflict with some distinct differences from the  
conflict period, and some stasis in other respects.  
IV: CONTENTIOUS  ZONES: INTO  THE  INTERROGATION  CENTER 
Post-arrest  data  are  best contextualized  in  terms  of  the  contested  history  of 
interrogation and detention in Northern Ireland, which can partly be considered a 
struggle for the juridification of the interrogation room. The juridification struggle 
occurs  in all  interrogation  rooms  but  is particularly  pronounced  in  democratic 
states, struggling to manage terrorism by law. The juridification of that contested 
space mirrors a broader tension between a war-versus-criminal model of conflict 
control, a debate with ongoing contemporary resonance. 72 This tension manifests 
both politically and legally and in turn entails a battle between the secret and the 
open  state.  Invoking  this  tension  between  the  open  and  secret  state  is well-  
rehearsed.73 This article’s contribution is to expose the specificity of that tension 
in the highly ritualized and closed space of the interrogation room.  
70.  
  
71.  Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, ¶ 67 (UK), amended by Terrorism (Northern Ireland) Act 2006, c. 4, § 
5(2)–(3), sched. (UK) (denying bail under scheduled offenses unless detainee is admitted to bail by a 
judge of the High Court or the Court of Appeal, or by the judge of the court of trial on adjourning the 
trial of such person).  
72.  See, e.g., Jude McCulloch & Sharon Pickering,  Pre-Crime and Counter-Terrorism: Imagining  
Future Crime in the “War on Terror,” 49 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 628 (2009). 
73.  There  is  a substantial  and  varied literature  on  the  notion  of  the  “open”  and “closed”  state 
particularly in the context of national security infrastructure.  See, e.g., AMY  B. ZEGART, FLAWED  BY  
DESIGN:  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  THE  CIA,  JCS,  AND  NSC  (1999);  DAVID  R.  RUDGERS,  CREATING  THE  
SECRET STATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1943–1947 (2000).  
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Northern Ireland in the early 1970s was characterized by significant lawless-
ness as the state responded to the breakdown of the rule of law, intertwined with 
the emergence of what has variously been described as low-level armed conflict, 
terrorism,  and  extreme criminality. 74 In parallel  with  post-9/11  practices,  state 
abuse of persons in detention figured prominently—resulting in well-documented 
allegations of what could be termed “torture lite,” 75  and “torture heavy.”76 The 
late 1970s saw a police-based interrogation process in Northern Ireland for sus-
pected terrorist offenders (with interrogators coming from the regular Criminal 
Investigation Department (CID)), rather than the Special Branch (intelligence  
operatives).77 While  ordinary policing  management  of  arrest  and  detention 
for  ODCs  was  more closely regulated,  sustained legal challenges ultimately 
produced  evidence  of institutional  and individual lawlessness. 78  
See, e.g., Fox v. United Kingdom, App. No. 12244/86, 182 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990), 13 Eur.  
H.R. Rep. 157; COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, SUBMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
COMMITTEE  AGAINST  TORTURE  (1991),  https://caj.org.uk/1991/11/16/s002-submission-united-nations-  
committee-torture/. For other pertinent policy papers and briefs by the Committee on the Administration 
of  Justice dealing  with police  practices  in  Northern Ireland  in  the  1980s  and  1990s, see generally  
COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF Justice, https://caj.org.uk.
Sustained 
criticisms from international  oversight  bodies (including  the  United Nations  
Committee Against Torture (UNCAT) and the European Committee Against  
Torture (EuroCAT)),79  contributed to an increase in safeguards: video and then  
audio-recording,80 the introduction of provisions allowing defendants conditional 
access to lawyers, 81 and the appointment of an Independent Commissioner for the   
74.  See, e.g., BOYLE, HADDEN & HILLYARD, TEN YEARS, supra note 20; BRENDAN O’LEARY & JOHN  
MCGARRY,  THE  POLITICS  OF  ANTAGONISM:  UNDERSTANDING  NORTHERN  IRELAND  (1993);  CLIVE  
WALKER, THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN BRITISH LAW (1986).  
75.  See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 41, 66 (1978) (holding that the 
interrogation  techniques utilized  by  the  Government  of  the  United  Kingdom, specifically  hooding, 
prolonged  noise  exposure, sleep  deprivation,  reduced  diet,  and long  periods  of  standing  in painful 
postures,  caused  “at least  intense physical  and mental  suffering  and led  to  acute  psychiatric 
disturbances,” and amounted to inhuman treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention); see also 
Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 1978 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. 602, 604–06 (Eur. Ct. H.  
R.) (providing a summary of the same case).  
76. See generally Donnelly v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 5577/72, 1973 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 
212, 212–16 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.) (addressing allegations of torture that included beatings on the 
head, body, and genitals, the administration of electric shocks to the genitals, and the administration of  
psychiatric  drugs  meant  to  induce  confessions).  Note  that  in Donnelly,  the  Commission held  that  in 
proving systemic human rights violations, “administrative practices” includes only tolerance of brutality 
and ill-treatment at the highest levels of government.  See id. at 234–48. In practice, this threshold is very 
difficult to reach.  
77.  See, e.g., Jon Moran, Evaluating Special Branch and the Use of Informer Intelligence in Northern 
Ireland, 25 J. INTEL. & NAT’L SECURITY 1 (2010).  
78.  
  
79.  See  Brice  Dickson, Northern Ireland’s  Emergency Legislation  –  The  Wrong  Medicine? ,  1992  
PUB.  L.  592,  602  n.58  (discussing  hearings held  by  UNCAT  into allegations  of  torture  at  detention 
centers in Northern Ireland).  
80.  See The Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989, SI 1989/1341 (N. Ir. 12)  
art. 60-60A.  
81.  Id. at art. 59.  
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Holding Centers who would serve as a “watchdog.” 82 
In Northern Ireland, exceptionality extended not only to the legal architecture, 
but also to the physical structures. Interrogation sites are rarely oases of calm. As 
has been clear from U.S. experience in the War on Terror, the interrogation sites’ 
construction may constitute not simply a physical space, but it may also be an in-
tegral part of the process. 83 
See, e.g., Charlie Savage,  Camp X-Ray: A Ghost Prison, N.Y. TIMES  (Sept. 1, 2014), https://www.  
nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/01/us/Guanta´namo-camp-x-ray-ghost-prison-photographs.html;  see also 
Carol Rosenberg,  Lawyers Postpone Guanta´namo Testimony from CIA’S First ‘Black Site” Prisoner , MIAMI  
HERALD (Mar.  20,  2017), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/Guanta ´namo/ 
article139657118.html; Carol  Rosenberg,  Guanta´namo  Hearing Halted  by  Supposed  CIA “Black  Site”  
Worker Serving as War Court Linguist, MIAMI  HERALD (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/ 
nation-world/world/americas/Guanta´namo/article9600110.html; Jane Mayer, The Black Sites: A Rare Look  
Inside  the  C.I.A.’s  Secret  Interrogation  Program,  THE  NEW  YORKER  (Aug.  13,  2007),  http://www. 
newyorker.com/magazine/2007/08/13/the-black-sites.  The  issues  of  detention  remain heavily  contested  in 
Military  Commission pre-trial litigation,  noting  for example  the  ongoing litigation  in  the  case  of Khalid 
Shaikh Mohammad, Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarak Bin’Attash, Ramzi Binalshibh, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, 
and Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi, including defense motions to recuse the military judge and current 
prosecution team based on the behaviors and actions of both in the destruction of a black site in which it is 
believed detainees were held and subject to torture. Appellate Exhibit 425 (Mohammad), Mr. Mohammad’s 
Motion To Recuse Military Judge and the Current Prosecution Team, United States v. Mohammad (Mil. 
Comm’ns Trial  Judiciary  May  10,  2016), http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20 
(AE425(KSM)).pdf?ver=2016-05-27-113904-540; http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II  
%20(AE425(KSM)).pdf?ver=2016-05-27-113904-540; see also Appellate  Exhibit  425J,  Government 
Notice at 1, United States v. Mohammad (Mil. Comm’ns Trial Judiciary July 8, 2016), http://www.mc.mil/ 
Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(AE425J(Gov)).pdf, (attaching as an exhibit Bin al-Shibh v. Obama, 
No. 06-1725 (D.D.C. May 7, 2012), in which Judge Sullivan allowed the destruction of the site in question 
following  the  preservation  of  evidence  through alternative  methods, like digital  and  photographic  
preservation).  
Prolonged deprivation of daylight, fluctuations in heat 
and cold, noises, vibrations and surroundings that provoke disorientation and dis-
comfort,  may  raise  detainee  stress levels  and  increase  depression,  making  the 
detainee more susceptible to interrogators’ strategies. 84 
Cf. Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the CIA (Aug. 1, 2002), https:// 
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/05/memo-bybee2002.pdf (discussing  the loud 
noises that result from a technique known as “walling”).  
The site almost inevitably 
becomes the location of legal contestation. 85  For the United Kingdom, contesta-
tion was engaged by international human rights treaty obligations. This created a 
pathway to argue that the process of interrogation violated the prohibitions on tor- 
ture, inhuman and degrading treatment.86 
Castlereagh Holding  Center  was  the  prime  destination  for  detainees  in 
Northern Ireland arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Acts. As an official 
watchdog described the site, “physical conditions . . . are, to employ moderate  
82.  See Owen Bowcott, The Unexpected Visitor: The Appointment of Sir Louis Blom-Cooper QC to 
the New Post of Independent Commissioner for Northern Ireland’s Paramilitary Holding Centres Has 
Received a Guarded Welcome , THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 27, 1993, at 1, ProQuest, Doc. ID 293428411.  
83.  
84.  
85.  In  the  context  of  U.S.  post-9/11  practices,  see,  e.g.,  Boumediene  v.  Bush,  553  U.S.  723,  771 
(2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594 (2006); Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 98 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010); Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 650 (D.C. Cir. 2008),  vacated, Rasul v. Myers, 555 U.S. 1083  
(2008).  
86.  See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth  
Geneva Convention) art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.  
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language, austere and forbidding.” 87 Thirty cells provided detainee accommoda- 
tion, each with a floor area of 6.25 square metres, and furnished with a bed and 
chair. Following a complaint by another human rights watchdog, bedding, which 
had apparently been quite poor, was improved. 88 
HELSINKI WATCH & THE PRISON PROJECT, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRISON CONDITIONS IN THE  
UNITED  KINGDOM  8-10  (1992), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/UK926.PDF;  see  
HELSINKI  WATCH, HUMAN  RIGHTS  WATCH, CHILDREN  IN  NORTHERN  IRELAND: ABUSED  BY  SECURITY  
FORCES AND PARAMILITARIES 16 (1992).  
Cells were window-less, lit by 
artificial light  that  was  dimmed  at  night  but  never  turned  off.  There  were  no 
clocks,  and  no  reading  or  writing materials  were allowed.  The  European  
Committee for the Prevention of Torture found in its 1994 report that the “venti-
lation system appeared to function only moderately well and created a rather in-
trusive level of noise in certain cells.” 89 
From the moment of her arrival at the interrogation center, the detainee became 
the responsibility of the facility’s uniformed staff. The staff opened a custody re-
cord and subjected the detainee to a thorough search in which personal posses-
sions (including watches) were removed for the duration of her stay. The staff 
could take  the  detainee’s clothes  for  forensic  examination,  in which  case  they 
provided government-issued clothes (generally known as a “space suit”). Under a  
statutory code introduced under the Emergency Provisions Act,90 detainees were 
to be provided with notices detailing their [conditional] rights to have someone 
informed of their arrest, their rights of access to a legal counsel, and the main pro-
visions of the Criminal Evidence (NI) Order 1989 (which relates to abrogation of 
the right to silence, an issue examined below). The next stage was a medical ex-
amination carried out in the interrogation center’s medical surgery center by an 
officially appointed doctor. Once the examination was completed, the detainee 
was taken to her cell from which she might later be moved to an interview room. 
Castlereagh had a total of twenty-one interview rooms, broken up into a group 
of thirteen rooms adjacent to the cells, and a group of either rooms in a separate 
building. The rooms in the larger group measured six square meters, and were fit-
ted with a table and three chairs. As with the cells, there was no natural light – it 
appears  that  outside  windows  were  covered  in plywood  –  and  no clocks.  The 
other interview rooms were somewhat bigger and benefited from some sunlight. 
There were no facilities for exercise either indoors or outdoors. As the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture noted of the conditions, “[a]ll these fac-
tors contributed to create a distinctly claustrophobic atmosphere.” 91  
87.  SIR  LOUIS  BLOM-COOPER  QC,  FIRST  ANNUAL  (1993)  REPORT  OF  THE  INDEPENDENT  
COMMISSIONER FOR THE HOLDING CENTRES 32 (1994) (N. Ir.) [hereinafter FIRST ANNUAL BLOM-COOPER  
REPORT].  
88.  
89.  EUROPEAN  COMMITTEE  FOR  THE  PREVENTION  OF  TORTURE  AND  INHUMAN  OR  DEGRADING  
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM ON THE VISIT TO  
NORTHERN  IRELAND  CARRIED  OUT  BY  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMITTEE  FOR  THE  PREVENTION  OF  TORTURE  
AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT FROM 20 TO 29 JULY 1993, ¶ 40 (1994).  
90.  Cf. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 c. 53, sch. 1 (UK).  
91.  EUROPEAN  COMMITTEE  FOR  THE  PREVENTION  OF  TORTURE  AND  INHUMAN  OR  DEGRADING  
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, supra note 89, at ¶ 45.  
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Table 4. Relationship between Custody Duration and Confession  
In general, once the detainee was brought to the interview room, the Criminal 
Investigation Department (CID) began the interrogation. Generally, two detec- 
tives at a time carried out the questioning. These detectives rotated with one or 
more  other  teams,  the usual  practice  being  that  between  four  and  six  officers 
questioned the detainee. Undoubtedly, having a very large number of detectives 
conduct a particular interrogation may create confusion in the detainee, and there-
fore increase the risk of a false confession. Recognizing the need to keep a check 
on their numbers, the government commissioned the Bennett Report (following 
multiple allegations of ill-treatment), which recommended inter alia  that no more 
than six police personnel be involved in any one case. 92 Nevertheless, the prob-
lem persisted: our survey disclosed that this maximum was exceeded in 12 per- 
cent of cases in the 1988/9 data set.93 But the broader point is to illustrate the 
dynamic of juridification in the interrogation space. The data then reveal that not-
withstanding high-level recommendations to control and contain the nature of the 
92.  H.G.  BENNETT,  REPORT  OF  THE  COMMISSION  OF  INQUIRY  INTO  POLICE  INTERROGATION  
PROCEDURES  IN  NORTHERN  IRELAND,  1979,  Cmnd.  7497,  ¶  181  (UK).  In  addition,  the  Report  was 
instrumental in introducing changes (record-keeping, checks by superior officers, and medical and legal 
access) which had some significant impact on the approach to interrogation and treatment, especially 
after a legal basis was set out in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Powers) Act.  See Northern Ireland 
(Emergency Powers) Act of 1987, c. 30, §§ 14-16 (repealed 1991) (UK). 
93.  Data on file with authors.  
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interface between the detainee and the police, the impact of the policy recommen- 
dations varied.  
What is striking about this data is the obvious point that the majority of defend-
ants give confessional evidence to their interrogators within 48 hours after being  
brought  into  custody.  As  the  narrative  above  indicates,  the  conditions  under 
which individuals were held and the oppressiveness of the interrogation environ-
ment may have been a significant contributing factor to their willingness to give 
oral and/or written testimony. As will be discussed further below, this data set 
undermines expansive claims by the state for the imperative of prolonged deten- 
tion in order to extract sufficient evidence to charge and continue detention (on 
the assumption that the goal is to process such individuals through the courts). 
a. The Divergent Goals of Interrogation 
The  updated  U.S. Field Manual  on  Insurgencies  and  Counterinsurgencies 
(COIN) the Manual reflects a virtual global unanimity in its depiction of accurate 
and up-to-date intelligence as a key resource for the state facing terrorist chal-
lenges.94 
HEADQUARTERS, DEP’T OF THE  ARMY & HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS, FIELD MANUAL  
3–24 (MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING PUBLICATION 3-33.5), INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERINSURGENCIES,  
at 1–19, 1–20 (May 2014), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf.
Intelligence is the foundation of counter-insurgency action by the state. 
The COIN strategy outlined in the Manual draws on a variety of cross-jurisdic-
tional examples to highlight the consistency of this insight. 
At the outbreak of the Northern Ireland conflict, the authorities’ intelligence 
was famously poor, producing heavy reliance on prisoner interrogation. 95  In the 
short-term this deficit was tackled as a variety of intelligence agencies all operat-
ing in the jurisdiction built up informer networks, 96 constructed vast databases re-
cording details of homes and family life in insurgent-dominated areas, and later 
developed ever more effective aerial and electronic surveillance techniques. 
If the need for intelligence is a counter-insurgency truism, another is that inter-
rogation  purposes  have  bifurcated,  producing partly incompatible goals:  the 
discovery of data (typically the function of intelligence operatives), and the gen-
eration of confessions usable as evidence at trial (typically a police function). The 
latter entails examination of interrogation’s results by the courts, perhaps retro-
spectively imposing the juridic upon the interrogation room; the former may dic-
tate that interrogation be conducted according to a simple test of effectiveness, 
perhaps involving significant unlawfulness (including torture). In the authoritar-
ian state, this bifurcation may make little difference as the courts may be willing 
to overlook legal shortcomings in the evidence, but in the  rechtsstaat,97 there are 
likely  to  be limits  to  courts’ willingness  to  convict  on  confessions  obtained  
94.  
  
95.  Cf. FRANK KITSON, LOW INTENSITY OPERATIONS: SUBVERSION, INSURGENCY AND PEACEKEEPING  
142–43 (1971).  
96.  See Ron Dudai, Informers and the Transition in Northern Ireland , 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 32,  
35 (2012). 
97. Jacqueline Ross, Do Rules of Evidence Apply (Only) in the Courtroom? Deceptive Interrogation  
in the United States and Germany, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 443, 467 & n.127 (2008).  
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through abrasive interrogation. This bifurcation also manifested itself for a con-
siderable  period  in  Northern Ireland,  with  separate  administrative guidelines 
drawn up in 1977 (Guide to the Emergency Powers) on interrogation for intelli-
gence-gathering  as  distinct  from assembling legally-admissible  evidence. 98  
The  Guidance  was replaced  by  a  code  under  section  61  of  the  1991  EPA.  Northern Ireland 
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1991, c. 24, § 61 (UK). With respect to the Northern Ireland Office’s Guide 
to the Emergency Powers, police are reminded of the necessity to caution before questioning only when  
the detainee is suspected of an offense and when questions are put for the purpose of obtaining evidence 
to be put in court. The inference may be correctly drawn that not all persons are detained in connection  
with offenses nor questioned about them. CLIVE  WALKER, THE  PREVENTION  OF  TERRORISM  IN  BRITISH  
LAW 195 (2d ed. 1992). The use of the Guidance is also discussed in M ARK URBAN, BIG BOYS’ RULES:  
THE  SAS AND  THE  SECRET  STRUGGLE  AGAINST  THE IRA (1992). The parallels to this challenge in the 
United States are aptly illustrated by the Guanta ´namo Military Commissions. Detainees initially held 
and interrogated using torture with the stated goal of eliciting information to prevent further attacks on 
the United States, were later processed for trial by military commission, creating the insurmountable 
obstacle of ‘clean’ evidence.  See Christopher W. Behan, Everybody Talks: Evaluating the Admissibility 
of Coercively Obtained Evidence in Trials by Military Commission , 48 WASHBURN L.J. 563, 592 (2009); 
Carol  Rosenberg, How  Long  After  Torture  are  Statements Admissible?  Guanta ´namo  Court  Debates  
Question,  MIAMI  HERALD (Aug.  4,  2017), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/  
americas/Guanta´namo/article165305107.html; Morris D. Davis, Historical Perspective on Guanta ´namo 
Bay: The Arrival of the High Value Detainees , 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 115, 120 (2009). 
It 
ended formally in 1991 as the conflict was also heading into its end-game phase. 
In the Courts, the rules on the admissibility of evidence were weakened, thereby 
making confessional evidence the mainstay of many Diplock court trials with all 
the attendant challenges of legitimacy and fairness. 99 
The dilemmas in this sphere are likely to be particularly acute where the state 
initially  embarks  on  a  strategy  of  interrogation  for intelligence-gathering,  and 
later institutes trials on the basis of admissions obtained under interrogation. In 
the common law world, the only option is likely to be the alteration or abandon-
ment  of rules  on admissibility  of  confessions.  In  the  U.S.  experience,  the  first 
generation of military  commissions  can  be  seen partly  as  an  attempt  to  create 
quasi-judicial  entities  producing  convictions  using material  from intelligence-  
oriented interrogation.100 This strategy, aiming at reliance upon unlawfully obtained 
confessions  and  therefore  at  the exclusion  of  the  juridic,  proved non-viable  over 
time, as before the most recent generation of Military Commissions such confes-
sions became inadmissible. 101 In parallel, bifurcation in the United Kingdom ended  
with the Terrorism Act 2000 (Cessation of Effect of Section 76) Order, 2002, affirm-
ing again a non-linear move from exception to a form of regularization, in the enve-
lope of permanent anti-terrorism legislation. 102 Clearly the juridic trumps, but in a 
form of norm-exception hybrid that resists easy classification. 
98.  
99.  On the rules of admissibility in Diplock Courts,  see John D. Jackson & Sean Doran, Conventional 
Trials in Unconventional Times: The Diplock Court Experience , 4 CRIM. L.F. 503, 506–08 (1993).  
100.  See Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guanta´namo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization, 103 NW.  
U.L. REV. 1683, 1721–22 (2009). 
101.  David Cole, Military  Commissions  and  the  Paradigm  of  Prevention ,  in  GUANTANAMO  AND  
BEYOND:  EXCEPTIONAL  COURTS  AND  MILITARY  COMMISSIONS  IN  COMPARATIVE  AND  POLICY  
PERSPECTIVE (Oren Gross & Fionnuala Nı ´ Aola´in, eds. 2013).  
102.  The Terrorism Act 2000 (Cessation of Effect of Section 76) Order 2002, SI 2002/2141 (UK).  
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V. ACCESS  TO  LAWYERS 
Globally, the question of access by independent lawyers to clients held in inter-
rogation centers is a fraught issue. Contact with the outside world, particularly  
within the first forty-eight  hours of  detention,  is recognized as one  of the best 
brakes on detainee ill-treatment. 103 A prisoner may find herself having to deal 
with a mass of unfamiliar legal requirements in a highly charged environment. 
From the state’s perspective, access to independent lawyers may be seen to break 
interrogation’s rhythm, limiting its effectiveness. Where the interrogation is con-
ducted by, or at the behest of, the secret state, unlawfulness may be common, pro-
viding independent lawyers with opportunities ripe for legal exposure in a way 
that  conflicts  with  the  secret  state’s  agenda  and  effectiveness. Similarly,  there 
may be resistance to lawyers’ presence during interrogation, not simply because 
this would hamper interrogators’ style, but also because the state will argue that 
sensitive information with which the detainee should be confronted cannot be dis-
closed in the lawyer’s presence. Finally, the state may conflate the lawyer’s pro-
fessional duty to her client’s case with unprofessional sympathy with the client’s 
cause, perhaps presuming that “they will pass information to terrorists” and/or  
“they are terrorists.”104 
Threats against lawyers were pervasive in Northern Ireland.  See SIR MICHAEL MORLAND, DAME  
VALERIE STRACHAN, AND SIR ANTHONY BURDEN, THE ROSEMARY NELSON INQUIRY REPORT, 2011, HC 
947, (UK); Fred Attewill,  RUC Ignored Death Threats Against Murdered Lawyer, THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 
19, 2007), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/sep/19/northernireland; Owen Bowcott, Pat Finucane 
Case: The Secret Service Failures and Black Ops That Led to Killing , THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2012), 
https:www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/dec/12/pat-finucane-secret-service-killing; Mark McGovern,  State 
Violence and the Colonial Roots of Collusion in Northern Ireland , 57 RACE & CLASS, no. 2, 2015, at 3;  
HUMAN  RIGHTS  FIRST,  A  TROUBLING  TURN:  THE  VILIFICATION  OF  HUMAN  RIGHTS  LAWYERS  IN  
NORTHERN IRELAND (2017), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/A-Troubling-Turn.pdf.
Even if the state (particularly the secret state), succeeds at 
first instance in whole or in part to exclude lawyers from interrogation centers, in  
the rechtstaat, multiple challenges by lawyers are likely in the superior courts. 105 
Lawyer participation therefore becomes a site of conflict where the battle for its 
juridification consistently plays out. 
U.S. authorities have, at various points, attempted to strictly limit access to ci-
vilian counsel for those Guanta ´namo prisoners without pending habeas petitions 
(although  at least  one federal  court  has  rejected  these  restrictions). 106  During  
103.  See G.A.  Res.  39/46,  annex,  Convention  Against  Torture  and  Other Cruel,  Inhuman  and  
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 6, ¶ 3 (Dec. 10, 1984). 
104.  
  
105.  See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); 
Averill v. United Kingdom, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 203; Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom, 
258  Eur.  Ct.  H.R.  29  (ser.  A)  (1993);  Stephen  J. Schulhofer, Checks  and balances  in  Wartime: 
American, British and Israeli Experiences , 102 MICH. L. REV. 1906 (2004).  
106.  In re  Guanta´namo  Bay Detainee  Continued  Access  to Counsel, No.  12-398, 2012 U.S.  Dist.  
LEXIS 126833, at *74 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2012); see also  Amy Shepard, Note, Hinging on Habeas? The  
Guanta´namo Memorandum of Understanding and the Detainees’ Continued Right to Counsel , 1 NAT’L  
SEC. L.J. 151 (2013) (evaluating the Memorandum of Understanding restrictions struck down in In re  
Guanta´namo  Bay  Detainee  Continued  Access  to Counsel); Fionnuala  Nı ´ Aola´in, Lawyers, Military 
Commissions and the Rule of Law in Democratic States , in COUNTER-TERRORISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM  
AND MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE (Colin King, Genevieve Lennon and Carole Mccartney, eds. 2018).  
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interrogation, prisoners had been denied access to lawyers of any kind, at least  
from 2002 to 2004.107 The protection of the attorney-client privilege remains an  
ongoing issue at the Guanta´namo Military Commissions. In pre-trial proceedings, 
the docket has consistently dealt with defense motions to permanently and verifi-
ably disable  audio  monitoring  equipment capability  in attorney-client  meeting  
rooms,108 
See Appellate Exhibit 133RR, Mr. al Baluchi’s Motion To Permanently and Verifiably Disable 
Audio Monitoring Capability in Attorney-Client Meeting Rooms, United States v. Mohammad (Military 
Comm’ns Trial  Judiciary July  17,  2017), http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20  
(AE133RR(AAA)).PDF.
as well as the effect on the attorney client relationships of an FBI inves-
tigation regarding one defense team and the infiltration of that same defense team  
by the FBI.109 In earlier versions, the Administration also sought in specific cases 
to limit and control the independence of counsel defending persons suspected of 
terrorist offenses. For example, in  the case  of Richard Reid, the U.K. national 
who tried to  ignite explosives  contained  in his shoes on  an American Airlines 
flight, Reid’s lawyers from the Federal Public Defender’s office refused to sign a 
document,  based  on  the Special  Administrative  Measures,  that effectively  re-
stricted  their ability  and  independence  to  conduct  their client’s  defense. 110 
Punitive  measures followed, including  the  administration’s  decision  to  cut  off 
access to their client. 111 In January 2007, a senior U.S. official condemned U.S. 
law firms for representing inmates of the Guanta ´namo internment camp, explic-
itly stating that it was “shocking” that they were “representing detainees down  
there” and suggesting that when corporate America was aware of their practices 
“those CEO’s are going to make those law firms choose between representing ter-
rorists or representing reputable firms.” 112 
Charles “Cully” Stimson, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for detainee affairs, sought 
to discourage American corporations from doing business with law firms that represented inmates of the  
Guanta´namo internment camp. Neil A. Lewis, Official Attacks Top Law Firms Over Detainees , N.Y.  
TIMES (Jan.  13,  2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/13/washington/13gitmo.html; Editorial, 
Editorial, Round Up the Usual Lawyers , N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/ 
13/opinion/13sat1.html.
A speedy Pentagon retraction followed  
these  remarks,113 
Josh White, U.S. Official Apologizes for Guanta ´namo Remarks, WASH. POST  (Jan. 17, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/16/AR2007011601442.html .
affirming  a  thread  we analyze  further  here, namely  the  
107.  See  LAUREL  FLETCHER  ET  AL.,  HUM.  RTS.  CTR.  AND  INT’L  HUM.  RTS.  L.  CLINIC,  U.C.,  
BERKELEY, GUANTA´ NAMO AND ITS AFTERMATH: U.S. DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PRACTICES AND  
THEIR IMPACT ON FORMER DETAINEES 77 (2008).  
108.  
  
109.  Nı´ Aola´in, Lawyers, Military Commissions and the Rule of Law in Democratic States supra  note  
106; David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantanamo , 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981 (2008).  
110.  United States v. Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84, 87-88 (D. Mass. 2002); see also Douglass Cassell, 
Pretrial and Preventive Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Options and Constraints Under International  
Law, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811 (2008) (discussing the use of preventative detention in Reid  
and other cases).  
111.  See Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 88. Special Administrative Measures (SAM’s) were regulations 
promulgated  by  Attorney General  Ashcroft  which allowed  the  imposition  upon Federal  Prisoners 
restrictions  inter alia  on  communication.  Id.  at  86. All  SAMs  are  prisoner  specific.  Id.  at  87.  The 
government eventually stood back from the measures and the limitations prevented what would have 
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continued (if limited) traction that accords to the right to counsel even when other 
related and fundamental rights in a due process context are being largely stripped 
of meaningful content. 
Clearly if restricting the pool of defense lawyers at Guanta ´namo was aimed 
at producing a cohort of docile advocates, the strategy failed. Links established 
by military lawyers with their civilian counterparts facilitated strategic claims- 
making in the civil courts, ultimately undermining three generations of Military  
Commissions.114 Moreover, the robust defense of detainees undertaken by mili-
tary defense lawyers presents an interesting sub-case of the dampening effect of 
legal counsel on the operation and effectiveness of the closed state. 115 
As  the  conflict  reignited  in  Northern Ireland  (from  1969  onwards),  persons 
held under emergency powers initially had no explicit right of access to a lawyer 
during detention. Eventually, a conditional right was granted in 1987. 116 While a 
proposal to limit access to a pool of selected counsel surfaced at one time, 117  the 
scheme came to nothing. Defense counsel faced challenges of access but rarely 
complete denial of legal representation. Faced with the numbers of CID officers  
114.  See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); In re Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, 866 F.3d 473 (D.C. Cir. 
2017) (per curiam); In re Khadr, 823 F.3d 92, 97 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2016); In re al-Nashiri 791 F.3d 71, 75–  
76 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  
115.  See  Laura  A.  Dickinson, Military  Lawyers  on  the Battlefield:  An Empirical  Account  of 
International Law Compliance , 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010) (analyzing the role of military lawyers in 
curbing transgressions and affecting legal culture in the zone of conflict). 
116.  Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1987, c. 30, § 15 (UK). 
117.  The issue arose when the Independent Commissioner for the Holding Centres, Sir Louis Blom- 
Cooper,  came  to  consider  the  UN  Basic Principles  on  the Role  of  Lawyers, principle  8  of  which 
provided: “All arrested, detained or imprisoned persons shall be provided with adequate opportunities, 
time and facilities to be visited by and to communicate with and consult with a lawyer without delay, 
interception or censorship and in full confidentiality. Such consultations may be within sight, but not 
within hearing, of law enforcement officials.” F IRST ANNUAL BLOM-COOPER REPORT, supra note 83, at  
65  (quoting  Eighth  United  Nations  Congress  on  the  Prevention  of  Crime  and  the  Treatment  of 
Offenders, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, art. 8 (Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990)). Provisions, such as 
those in the 1987 EPA allowing police officers to listen in on consultations would appear to have been 
ruled out by principle 8.  Compare 1987 EPA, supra note 110, at § 15, ¶ 11, with Basic Principles, art. 8. 
In addition, denial of access to solicitors as permitted in Northern Ireland would appear to conflict with 
principles  1,  5  and  8. Blom-Cooper  in  his  first  report  took  a  different  view.  Drawing  a  distinction 
between legal advice which is required prior to charging, and legal assistance which is called for once a 
suspect  has  been  charged,  his  opinion  was  that  the  UN principles “relate exclusively  to criminal  
proceedings. A person arrested on suspicion of having committed a crime, but who has not yet been 
charged with any offence, becomes subject to the rules of criminal justice only on being charged.” F IRST  
ANNUAL BLOM-COOPER REPORT, supra note 83, at 66. The UN principles were therefore inapplicable to  
the  situation  in  the  interrogation  centers  prior  to  charging.  Id. Elsewhere  he  opined:  “It  is  this legal 
advice to which the suspect is entitled to have access. It is, moreover, an entitlement to a service and not 
to an individual professional who is qualified to provide advice.”  Id. at 68. For that reason, he felt free to 
draw up a scheme whereby in place of the existing deferrable right to have access to a solicitor of his/her 
choice, the detainee would have access to a lawyer employed by a legal advice unit administered by the 
Law Society for Northern Ireland, and attached to the holding centre.  Id. at 68–71. Other lawyers, in his 
view, “should be debarred from any professional involvement at the Holding Centre.”  Id. at 70. See also 
B. Fitzpatrick and Clive Walker, Holding Centres in Northern Ireland, the Independent Commissioner  
and the Rights of Detainees, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 27, 38 (1999) (explaining that Blom-Cooper’s 
promotion of the Legal Advice Unit failed).  
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described  above,  detainees  were  at  a  distinct legal  disadvantage.  The  officers 
would  have  been familiar  with  the possibly  damning legal  consequences  that 
might flow from the use of particular words or phrases by the suspect, while she 
was almost invariably not. This was particularly so in the context of the limita-
tions on the “right to silence,” the common-law incarnation of the right against 
self-incrimination, introduced in Northern Ireland in 1988. 118 The problems were 
compounded by the nebulousness of the grounds for arrest under the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act (suspicion of involvement in terrorism), which might result in 
the detainee not being told of which (if any) specific offense she was suspected. 
And in the case of an incommunicado arrest where family and friends were not 
informed, this general insecurity would have been exacerbated by an acute sense 
of isolation for the detainee. 
PTA detainees were therefore particularly in need of access to their lawyers – 
indeed in England and Wales during the same period it was the norm not only to 
allow such consultation when requested, but also to permit counsel to sit in on her 
client’s interrogation. In Northern Ireland, the position was quite different. The  
1991  Emergency  Provisions  Act  provided  that  the  right  of  access  by  a  person 
held under the “terrorism provisions” 119 could be delayed for up to 48 hours at a 
time, where a police superintendent had reasonable grounds to believe the exer-
cise of the right might lead to such consequences as the harming of evidence or 
the alerting of suspects not yet arrested. 120  
These  powers  are  based  upon,  but  are  more  draconian  than,  provisions  of 
PACE which have also been followed in PACE (NI) 1989. 121 Despite the fact that 
the uniform branch of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) are regarded as hav-
ing overall responsibility  for  the  detainee’s welfare,  the  decision  on  access  to 
legal advisors was invariably made by an officer from the detective branch, those 
engaged specifically in direct counter-terrorism management. 
In line with experience elsewhere around the globe, it is possible that denial of 
access  to counsel  was  motivated less  by  suspicion  that  information would  be 
passed to paramilitary groups than by fear that access would interfere with inter-
rogation. Accordingly,  a  number  of  motions  attempted  to challenge  and  force  
118. See generally  SUSAN  EASTON, THE  CASE  FOR  THE  RIGHT  TO  SILENCE (2d ed. 1998); Andrew  
Ashworth & Peter Creighton, The Right of Silence in Northern Ireland , in LESSONS  FROM  NORTHERN  
IRELAND 117 (Jon Hayes & Paul O’Higgins eds., 1990). 
119.  Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991, c. 24, § 45(1) (UK).  
120.  Section 45(8) of the 1991 EPA, id., provided for delays where a senior officer believes access 
“(a) will lead  to  interference  with  or  harm  to  evidence  connected  with  a scheduled  offence  or 
interference with or physical injury to any person; or (b) will lead to the alerting of any person suspected 
of having committed such an offence but not yet arrested for it; or (c) will hinder the recovery of any 
property obtained as a result of such an offence; or (d) will lead to interference with the gathering of 
information about the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism; or (e) by alerting any 
person, will make it more difficult—(i) to prevent an act of terrorism; or (ii) to secure the apprehension,  
prosecution or conviction of any person in connection with the commission, preparation or instigation of  
an act of terrorism.” Id. at § 45(8). 
121.  The Police  and Criminal  Evidence  (Northern Ireland)  Order  1989,  SI  1989/1341  (N.  Ir.  12)  
art. 59.  
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some reasonable explanation for the delay, thus confirming that the matter could 
be susceptible to meaningful scrutiny by the courts. 122 
Following a series of high court decisions concerning access to legal counsel 
there was a marked fall-off in denial of access to legal counsel in the 1990s in 
Northern Ireland, suggesting that repeated challenges may have had an ameliorat-
ing effect on police conduct. 123 This represents an important point of juridification  
and a tipping from de facto deference to intelligence towards prioritization to due 
process  constraints. Also  significant  was  an  emerging  practice  of  courts  in  the 
122.  In  Re  McNearney,  the Belfast  High  Court held  that  the police  (RUC)  had  to  offer  specific 
reasons for  the denial  of  access  to legal counsel,  and  that general claims would not suffice.  See, Re 
McNearney [1991] High Court (NI). In Re Duffy, the solicitor whose access had been denied sought to 
challenge  his exclusion  by reliance  on  an  undertaking  which  he  had  provided  to  the  RUC,  “Not  to 
communicate  with  any  person,  any  matter  as  to  what  occurred  during consultation  for  the  deferred 
period”  and  “[t]o  maintain total  supervision  over  any  papers relating  to  this consultation.”  In  this  
instance access was granted since the High Court accepted the argument that “there is now no risk of a 
message containing a coded warning to terrorists being conveyed, because the solicitor has given an 
undertaking, the sincerity of which has not been challenged, that he will not pass on any message to 
anyone.” This was not however, a blanket validation of such undertakings, since the court was at pains 
to state that it recognized that there was a possibility that in a particular case, an undertaking “could not 
be relied upon.” The giving of such undertakings therefore presents a number of problems for lawyers. 
Were  the police  to  assert,  as  it  was  suggested  in  Re  Duffy  they  might,  that  a particular solicitor’s 
undertaking  was unreliable,  this would  have  the  effect  of  marking  out  the solicitor  in  question  as  a 
‘terrorist sympathizer’ with all the consequences which could flow from such a categorization. If the 
grounds on which the RUC’s opinion of a particular solicitor were to be challenged, the police would 
almost certainly claim that this was a confidential intelligence matter, the sources for which could not be 
disclosed. Re Duffy’s Application [1991] 7 N.I.J.B. 62 HC. Even were the court not to accept the RUC’s 
assertion, the damage would have been done. Moreover, as the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 
pointed out, undertakings not to disclose information are in direct conflict with the solicitor’s obligation 
to  his/her client  to  use  information gleaned  from  the initial  interview  to  seek exculpatory  evidence 
without delay, or simply to relay pressing messages to the detainees’ family. L AWYERS COMMITTEE FOR  
HUMAN  RIGHTS,  HUMAN  RIGHTS  AND  LEGAL  DEFENSE  IN  NORTHERN  IRELAND  (1993).  Subsequent 
rulings have, in any case, tended to undermine the usefulness of these undertakings. Re McKenna and 
McKenna involved an application for judicial review of denial of access where the solicitor in question 
filed  an  undertaking  in  the usual  terms.  In  response,  the police  asserted  that  where  a solicitor  had 
submitted  an  undertaking  in  good  faith,  a paramilitary  group would still  force  him/her  to divulge 
information through kidnapping and torture. This prompted the solicitor to submit an affidavit in which 
he averred that “It has not been my personal experience nor has it been the experience of any member of 
this firm that any pressure has been brought to bear by members of terrorist organizations to divulge 
confidential information.” In the event, police investigations were completed before the matter came to 
court, and access had been granted. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal took the opportunity to deal with 
the substance  of  the  matter holding  that  the police  had  satisfied  the  burden  of  proof  that  there  were 
reasonable  grounds  for  the  Superintendent’s belief  “because  the Provisional  IRA  is  a completely 
ruthless and unscrupulous terrorist organization which would be fully prepared to threat (sic), against 
him or his family, to compel [the solicitor] against his will and in breach of his undertaking, to disclose 
to it what the applicants had told him in the course of consultations.” Re McKenna and McKenna [1991] 
Court of Appeal (NI, unreported). The ruling was buttressed by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re 
Kenneway, in which substantially the same police argument was accepted. While there has, in Britain, 
been some willingness to  accept the  ‘coded message’  argument when considering  the  corresponding 
provisions of PACE, the courts in general have taken a more robust attitude to police assertions than has 
been  evident  in  Northern Ireland  and  no  ‘kidnapping’  argument  has  ever  been  accepted  (or  even 
presented). In re Kenneway’s Application [1992] Court of Appeal (Northern Ireland) (unreported).  
123.  See, e.g., R v. McNeill [1993] NI 46, 48 CA; R v. Harper [1990] NI 28, 30 CA; R v. Dillon and  
Another, [1984] NI 292, 292 CA.  
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jurisdiction to issue interim injunctions which prevented interrogation prior to the 
hearing  of  the  substantive  issue.  Thus,  even  where  the application ultimately 
failed, the interrogation process had been interrupted. The change may also have 
come  about  from  a realization  that  a  strategy  of over-reliance  on  far-fetched 
excuses  before  judges  for denial  of  access would  prove untenable  in  the long  
term.124 A further factor facilitating access may have been the willingness of the 
courts to exclude confessions obtained when access to a lawyer has been mani-
festly unlawfully denied, 125 though in other cases where admissibility of confes-
sions  has  been challenged  on  the  basis  of denial  of  access,  the Diplock  courts 
displayed a willingness to accept the kind of police arguments advanced in the ju-
dicial review cases. 126 
Developments in relation to access to legal advice in the 1990s were not, how-
ever, uniformly  positive,  as lawyers  reported  an  innovative  tactic  of  granting 
access immediately following arrest, and then subsequently using the power to 
defer access to allow questioning to continue. 127 This had the advantage from the 
police point of view of enabling the investigating officers to claim that the suspect 
had immediate access to independent legal advice if the matter was raised (for 
instance, where the admissibility of a confession is at issue). But, from the detain- 
ee’s point of view, this arrangement offered the distinct disadvantage that since 
the consultation would generally take place before the interrogation started, she 
would typically have no idea of the charges (if any) she would face, and thus the 
effective legal advice the lawyer would provide was very limited. Where access 
was granted, it is not at all clear that the confidentiality of the lawyer-client rela-
tionship was respected, even where there had been no stipulation that the consul-
tation take place within the vision of a police officer. 
At the start of this century, patterns from the 1990s concerning access to counsel 
for terrorism related (PTA) detainees remained largely intact, although some shifts  
were evident. Most striking in our survey data was the extent to which the picture  
of PTA detentions provided the reverse image to those under PACE (NI). In 86 
percent of PTA detentions, the prisoners’ lawyer was not present during interroga- 
tion (Table 5), the typical practice being that access was granted when the detainee 
was first brought to Castlereagh, and then after forty-eight hours. In the case of 
PACE (NI) detentions however, 87 percent of prisoners had their lawyers present  
(Table 5). Reflecting a degree of softening in the police position, 8 percent of PTA 
detainees were permitted to have their lawyers present during some or all of the 
124.  For example, to many seasoned observers of the legal system in Northern Ireland, the prospect 
of solicitors or their families being kidnapped and mistreated by paramilitary groups seems less than 
entirely convincing. No evidence was forthcoming that such events had taken place in the past, and were 
such kidnappings to occur, it is unlikely that solicitors would continue with their current work practices. 
The result therefore for paramilitary organizations whose members (or alleged members) were regularly 
appearing before the Courts, would have been practically entirely counter-productive.  
125.  See R v. Gilgunn (Oct. 1991) (unreported).  
126.  See R v. Harper [1990] NI 28 CA.  
127.  See Martin S. Flaherty, Interrogation, Legal Advice, and Human Rights in Northern Ireland , 27  
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1995).  
interrogation. These prisoners benefited from a regime that had already been in 
place in England, and would be introduced in Northern Ireland a few years later. 
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Table 5. Detention Power & Presence of a Lawyer   
 Lawyer Presence & Interrogation      
 
L. Present All   
Interrogations  
L. Present Some   
Interrogations  
Lawyer Not   
Present  
Not Known Total    
Arrest Power    Row %    Row %    Row %    Row %   Col  %   
S.14 PTA  
1989    
3    4%    3    4%    69    86%    5    6%    80    63%  
S.18 EPA  
1996    
0    0%    0    0%    0    0%    0    0%    0    0%  
Art 26 PACE   
(NI) 1989    
33    87%    1    3%    4    11%    0    0%    38    30%  
Other    5    63%    0    0%    3    38%    0    0%    8    6%  
Not known    1    100%    0    0%    0    0%    0    0%    1    1% 
Total    42    33%    4    3%    76    60%    5    4%    127    100%  
The issue of access to counsel also illustrates the salience of the Diplock system’s  
hybridity at the start of the twentieth century. Two quite distinct feeder mechanisms 
are identifiable: the PTA route and that of PACE (NI). This multiplicity of routes to 
access counsel carried through to trial, where the insertion of a PACE stream into 
the Diplock system seemed to present few institutional difficulties (the issue of con-
fessions is discussed below). This finding underscores our broader hypothesis that  
there is fluidity both ways: exception-norm and norm-exception. This both provides 
further support for the juridification hypothesis, but also implicitly articulates some 
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ambivalences: the fact that towards the end of the conflict the ordinary law on deten-
tion could be knitted seamlessly with Diplock trials meant that the system approxi-
mated more to the legal norm; but this may only have been possible at least partly 
because  the legal  norm,  (represented  by PACE  (NI)),  was heavily shaped  by  the 
exception  (represented  by  the  PTA). Overall,  however,  access  to lawyers  has 
improved as evidenced by a marked increase in access to lawyers under PACE con- 
ditions,128 
DAVID  BROWN,  HOME  OFFICE,  PACE  10  YEARS  ON:  A  REVIEW  OF  THE  RESEARCH  91–121  
(Home  Office  Research  Study  155,  1997)  (UK);  TOM  BUCKE  &  DAVID  BROWN,  HOME  OFFICE,  IN  
POLICE  CUSTODY:  POLICE  POWERS  AND  SUSPECTS’  RIGHTS  UNDER  THE  REVISED  PACE  CODES  OF  
PRACTICE 19–29 (Home Office Research Study 174, 1997) (UK). Northern Ireland Office statistics for 
terrorism arrests after the passage of the Terrorism Act show limited refusals / delays in access.  See, e.g.,  
NORTHERN  IRELAND STATISTICS  AND  RESEARCH  AGENCY, NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, RESEARCH AND  
STATISTICAL BULLETIN 2/2002, NORTHERN IRELAND STATISTICS ON THE OPERATION OF THE TERRORISM  
ACT  2000: JULY-SEPTEMBER 2001, at 17, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20040722012500/ 
http://www.nio.gov.uk/azlist.htm.
approximated to the exception (represented by PTA).  
VI. CONFESSIONAL  EVIDENCE  AND  THE  CLOSED  STATE 
Walsh’s 1984 study found that 90 percent of Diplock cases were based solely 
or mainly on confessions. 129 The figure is striking, particularly when seen against 
the background of abusive interrogation in Northern Ireland in the 1970s. 130  The 
key to understanding the role played by confessions in the Diplock system lies in 
the special rules for the admissibility of confessions before Diplock courts intro- 
duced by the Emergency Provisions Act.131  At the start of the conflict the ordi-
nary law  demanded  that  confessions  be voluntary  in  order  to  be admissible. 
Predictably, confessions obtained in interrogation-oriented facilities were ruled 
inadmissible  by  the  ordinary  courts.  In  order  to  preserve  this  interrogation- 
oriented approach, the voluntariness test was abolished for the Diplock courts. 132 
In its place came a test that made statements inadmissible if obtained by inhuman  
or degrading treatment or torture.133  This begged the question of the degree of  
coercion short of inhuman or degrading treatment (the European Convention on  
128.  
  
129.  WALSH, supra note 20, at 84.  
130.  See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978) (the judgments and decisions in 
the case); Ireland v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (multiple years) (the pleadings, European  
Commission on Human Rights’ report to the European Court of Human Rights, and other documents);  
Samantha  Newbery, Intelligence  and Controversial  British  Interrogation  Techniques:  The  Northern 
Ireland Case 1971–2 , 20 IRISH STUD. INT’L AFF. 103, 103–04 (2009). 
131.  The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions Act) 1973, c. 53, § 6 (UK).  
132.  REPORT  OF  THE  COMMISSION  TO  CONSIDER  LEGAL  PROCEDURES  TO  DEAL  WITH  TERRORIST  
ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972, Cmnd. 5185, para. 80 (UK) (noting that the legal requirement 
of voluntary admission would exclude all statements uncovered through interrogation).  
133.  The first revised test was set out in the 1973 EPA,  supra note  124. Over time,  this  changed 
slightly, so that section 11 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991 provided:  
(2) Where . . . —  
(a) the prosecution proposes to give, or (as the case  may be) has given, in evidence a  statement  
made by the accused, and  
(b)  prima  facie  evidence  is  adduced  that  the  accused  was  subjected  to  torture,  to  inhuman  or 
degrading  treatment,  or  to  any violence  or  threat  of violence  (whether  or  not  amounting  to 
torture), in order to induce him to make the statement, then, unless the prosecution satisfies the  
400  JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 9:367 
Human  Rights  standard)  that  might  be permissible. While  at least  one  judge 
seemed willing to tolerate “a moderate degree of physical ill-treatment,” 134  this 
approach was not acceptable to the superior courts. The message that interroga-
tors appear to have received is that confessions did not need to be voluntary, but 
could not be relied on if the detainee bore marks of physical ill treatment. This 
provided the legislative backdrop to the plethora of ill-treatment allegations in 
the late 1970s. Over the years, the test for admissibility was tightened somewhat 
by statute and through case law, but it remained distinct from the ordinary law. If 
reliance on the confession declined overall, it still retained obvious attractions for 
the intelligence operatives who conducted the interrogations. First, it had the vir-
tues of simplicity: a conviction could be obtained on no evidence other than a  
statement provided by the defendant. Second, where a defendant made a confes-
sion, there was no need to go behind the statement in a way that might disclose 
why the interrogators had begun questioning her about that particular crime. The 
result could be to protect informers and/or electronic surveillance strategies. 
Our data tracked the decline of confessions in the Diplock system, with a signif-
icant downward shift in 1988/89, culminating in a situation in 2001–02 in which 
confessions were present in only 25 percent of cases (Table 7). What empirical 
evidence at the latter stages of the conflict in Northern Ireland illustrates is that  
safeguards designed to guard against abusive interrogation practices, and height- 
ened scrutiny by the U.N. and European Committees Against Torture,135  
See,  e.g.,  Commission  for  the  Prevention  of  Torture, Conditions  of  Detention  in Police 
Establishments: United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) Visit Report 1993 , COUNCIL  OF EUROPE (Mar. 13,  
1994),  http://hudoc.cpt.coe.int/eng?i=p-gbr-19930720-en-12;  Commission  for  the  Prevention  of  
Torture, Recapitulations and Conclusions/ A. Castlereagh Holding Centres , COUNCIL  OF  EUROPE (July  
21,  2000),  http://hudoc.cpt.coe.int/eng?i=p-gbr-19991129-en-35;  Committee  Against  Torture,  Fourth 
Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/67/  
Add. 2 (May. 27, 2004).
seem to 
have had a practical impact in the custodial space. Certainly, at least, claims of ill- 
treatment greatly decreased. One contributory factor that may explain this shift is 
that  the  state  became increasingly reliant  upon  (and  more  expert  in  gathering) 
“hard”  evidence:  this  evidence would typically include  scene-of-the-crime   
court that the statement was not obtained by so subjecting the accused in the manner indicated by that 
evidence, the court shall do one of the following things, namely— 
(i) in the case of a statement proposed to be given in evidence, exclude the statement; 
(ii) in the case of a statement already received in evidence, continue the trial disregarding the  
statement; or 
(iii) in either case, direct that the trial shall be restarted before a differently constituted court 
(before which the statement in question shall be inadmissible). 
(3) It is hereby declared that, in the case of any statement made by the accused and not obtained by so  
subjecting  him  as  mentioned  in  subsection  (2)(b)  above,  the  court  in  any  such  proceedings  as  are  
mentioned in subsection (1) above has a discretion to do one of the things mentioned in subsection (2)(i)  
to (iii) above if it appears to the court that it is appropriate to do so in order to avoid unfairness to the 
accused or otherwise in the interests of justice. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991, c.  
24, § 11 (UK). 
134.  R. v. McCormick [1977] NI 105, 111 (Belfast) .  
135.  
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forensics and fiber evidence (which figured significantly in our survey). 136 
This instinct seemed to have been shared by non-state actors also evidenced by the bombing of 
the building which housed and processed such evidence in the 1990s.  See David McKittrick, Damage in 
Huge Blast Put at 20m Pounds: A Belfast Housing Estate Counts the Cost of an IRA Bomb Which May 
Have Destroyed Vital Criminal Evidence , THE INDEPENDENT (Sep. 24, 1992), http://www.independent. 
co.uk/news/uk/damage-in-huge-blast-put-at-20m-pounds-a-belfast-housing-estate-counts-the-cost-of-an- 
ira-bomb-which-1553481.html.
One further dimension that may explain the data’s demonstration of a decrease  
in confession-based evidence is a shift due to the abrogation of the right against 
self-incrimination – the “right to silence,” discussed above. The dynamics of this 
shift are the subject of a separate analysis in our larger research project, and that 
analysis will  not  be replicated  here.  What  can  be  noted  is  that  the Criminal  
Evidence  (NI)  Order  1988  permits  inferences,  which  may be  negative,  from  a 
detainee’s failure to mention a fact that she later relies upon in defense, or where 
she fails to account for marks on her clothes, or for her presence in a particular 
place.137 A detainee may have perfectly understandable reasons for staying silent,  
and yet run the risk of negative inferences.138 In any case, the Order may place  
the interrogator in a win-win situation. If the detainee speaks, she may incrimi-
nate herself, but if she stays silent in response to specific questions, she may also 
incriminate herself. Our survey highlighted universal use of a new general cau- 
tion139 (“post-Miranda”  in  U.S.  terms),  and  significant levels  of  use  of  the 
136.  
 
137.  The Order enables a judge, jury or magistrate to draw ‘such inferences . . .’ as appear proper 
from an accused’s silence in four main circumstances: 
* (Art. 3) where during police questioning s/he fails to mention a fact relied on in her defence in  
subsequent proceedings; 
* (Art. 4). where at his trial s/he fails to give evidence or to answer questions (without cause) when  
requested by the court; 
*  (Art.  5)  where following  arrest,  s/he fails  when  requested  to  account  for  the  presence  of  any 
object, substance or mark on her person, clothing or in her possession or in any place in which  
s/he is at the time of her arrest; 
* (Art. 6) where following arrest, s/he fails to account for her presence at a place at the time the 
offence for which s/he was arrested is alleged to have been committed. 
Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988, SI 1988/1987 (N.I. 20) (as amended). Silence in  
these circumstances can be taken to amount to corroboration of other evidence against the accused, see  
id., but a person cannot be convicted solely on the basis of an inference from her silence.  Id. at Art. 2(4). 
Inferences under the Order can be drawn at committal stage, when deciding whether the accused has a 
case to answer at the end of the prosecution case, and when reaching a finding of guilt or innocence.  Id.  
at Art. 3(2). 
138.  In the case of someone detained under the PTA, since the police do not need to explain the 
precise offenses suspected, the person may be afraid to break her silence, because to do so may risk 
suggesting involvement in some as yet unknown crimes. The person may also be afraid that to speak will 
implicate others, and thus attract the ‘informer’ label, with possible lethal consequences at the hands of 
paramilitary  groups.  Uncertainty  about  their legal  position  my also lead  them  to  refuse  to  answer 
questions until they have had the opportunity to speak to their solicitor, an event which, as discussed  
above, can be deferred for 48 hours at a time. 
139.  In response to the introduction of the Order, a new general caution was introduced by the RUC 
in the following terms (1988): 
You do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so but I must warn you that if you fail to men-
tion any fact which you rely on in your defence in court, your failure to take this opportunity to men-
tion it may be treated in court as supporting any relevant evidence against you. If you do wish to say  
anything, what you say may be given in evidence.  
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provisions of the Order in relation to such issues as requiring explanations for the 
presence of fibers or for the defendant’s location at particular times. 
The  Order  was  introduced  in  Northern Ireland  by  an  expedited  “Order  in 
Council” procedure  as  part of an “anti-terrorist  package” following one  of the 
region’s periodic upsurges in violence. 140 
One of the worst atrocities of the conflict was the Omagh Bombing, which swiftly led to further 
legal responses by the state.  See Omagh Bomb: 15 August 1998, BBC (last viewed on Sep. 4, 2017),  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/omagh_bomb.  The legislation  which followed  was  the Criminal  
Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998, c. 40 (UK). See Clive Walker,  The Bombs in Omagh and 
their  Aftermath:  The Criminal  Justice  (Terrorism  and  Conspiracy  Act)  1998 ,  62  MOD.  L.  REV.  879  
(1999).  
Shortly thereafter, with some pockets  
of dissent,141 virtually identical provisions were legislated for in Britain. 142  The 
result was that provisions initially having the aura of exceptionality soon became 
entrenched and normalized, reinforcing the point that the exception changed the 
norm in its own image, and the scope of normal criminal justice norms was irrev-
ocably changed. 
Defense lawyers play a critical part in the legitimization process that is ever- 
present  in exceptional  court  regimes.  The  right  to  defend oneself  or  to  be 
defended by legal assistance of one’s own choosing is deeply entrenched in the 
normative  framework  of  many  constitutions  and also  in international  human 
rights’ law treaties. 143 In multiple contexts the state places specific constraints on 
the  access  to  and  independence  of  defense counsel. 144 
See  FIRST  ANNUAL  BLOM-COOPER  REPORT,  supra  note  83,  at  68–76  (recommending 
establishment of a “legal advice unit” to advise persons detained at Holding Centres and indicating that 
in most instances such unit would take the place of private solicitors). A cogent U.S. example is the 
decision of a federal judge in Manhattan to reject a request for a lawyer for Nazih Abdul-Hamed al-  
Ruqai, who faced indictment on conspiracy charges stemming from the 1998 bombing of two United  
States  embassies  in  East  Africa.  See,  e.g.,  Benjamin  Weiser,  Request  to  Appoint  Lawyer  for  Terror  
Suspect is Denied, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/12/nyregion/request- 
to-appoint-lawyer-for-terror-suspect-is-denied.html. Acknowledging  the  importance  of  transparency 
and participation  by external counsel in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court  (FISC) proceedings, 
modifications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 2015 permit appointment of amicus 
curiae to address concerns about legitimacy and independence at the FISC.  See USA Freedom Act of  
2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401, 129 Stat. 267, 279-80.
Paradoxically, lawyers 
occupy a singular space by simultaneously providing the means to undermine the 
courts they operate within and legitimate them by the fact of their representation.  
Maintaining  the  convention  of  independent  representation  remains  a  defining 
Additional forms of caution are employed where the RUC wish to invoke the provisions of art. 5 and art. 
6 of the Order. Cited in Averill v. United Kingdom No 36408/97 ECtHR (Third Section), decision of  
06.07. 1999. 
140.  
141.  See ROYAL  COMMISSION  ON  CRIMINAL  JUSTICE, REPORT, 1993, Cm. 2263, at 55 (UK) (“They 
may still choose to run the risk of such comment, or indeed to remain silent throughout their trial. But if 
they  do,  it will  be  in  the knowledge that  their  hope  of  an acquittal  rests  on  the ability  of defending 
counsel either to convince the jury that there is a reasonable explanation for the departure or, where 
silence is maintained throughout, to discredit the prosecution evidence in the jury’s eyes”).  
142.  See, e.g., Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, c. 33, §§ 34–38 (UK).  
143.  E.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(3)(d), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N. 
T.S.  171  (“Everyone  charged  with  a criminal  offense shall  have  the  right  .  .  .  to  be  charged  in  his 
presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing . . .”).  
144.  
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aspect of Special Courts and Military Commissions in most contexts. 145  States 
seem generally willing  to  carry  the  costs  of  the internal  and external  critiques 
posed by such lawyers, including the ongoing possibility that strong representation 
may assist persons charged in being fully acquitted. The benefit to the state is ulti-
mately linked to the perceptions of legitimacy that may follow from the services 
provided by defense counsel. Our analysis here seeks to chart what the impact of 
lawyers’ presence will have on the substance and outcomes of interrogations.  
The data’s most surprising finding is that, in terms of confessions, it did not 
seem to make that much difference whether lawyers were present or not. This 
finding is counter-intuitive to much of the advocacy that has pervaded public and 
legal debates concerning access of terrorist detainees to legal counsel. 146  In our 
Northern Ireland dataset, confessions were more likely in situations covered by 
the regular criminal law (PACE (NI) cases) where defense counsel was present  
(29 percent) than in PTA cases (22 percent) where none was present (Table 6).
In many of the heated debates concerning detention of persons suspected of  
terrorist crimes, states continue to press for extended detention of suspects—and 
usually meet significant resistance from civil libertarians and others concerned 
with the effect on due process rights and the rule of law. 147 
See, e.g., HOUSE  OF  LORDS  AND  HOUSE  OF  COMMONS  JOINT  COMMITTEE  ON  HUMAN  RIGHTS,  
COUNTER-TERRORISM  POLICY  AND  HUMAN  RIGHTS:  28  DAYS,  INTERCEPT  AND  POST-CHARGE  
QUESTIONING, 2006-07, HL 157, HC 394 (UK), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200607/jtselect/  
jtrights/157/157.pdf;  CLAIRE  FEIKERT,  LAW  LIBRARY  OF  CONGRESS,  UNITED  KINGDOM:  PRE-CHARGE  
DETENTION  FOR  TERRORIST  SUSPECTS (2008), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/uk-pre-charge-detention/  
uk-pre-charge-detention.pdf.
In France, following the July 2016 Nice attack, authorities extended a state of emergency that had 
been  invoked following  previous  attacks  in  2015  pursuant  to  France’s  1955  governing  states  of  
emergency. See Loi 2016-1767 du 19 de´cembre 2016 prorogeant l’application de la loi n˚ 55-385 du 3 
avril  1955 relative  a ` l’e´tat  d’urgence  [Law  No.  2016-1767  of  19  December  2016  Extending  the 
Application of Law No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 Regarding the State of Emergency], Journal Officiel de 
la  Re ´publique  Franc¸aise  [J.O.] [Official  Gazette  of  France],  Dec.  20,  2016.  For  a  criticism  of  the 
expansion  of police  power  in  France,  see Elias Groll, Hollande’s  Post-Paris  Power  Grab ,  FOREIGN  
POLICY (Nov. 20, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/20/hollandes-post-paris-power-grab/.  
For a discussion of this issue in Germany, see Christopher Michaelson,  From Strasbourg with Love: 
Preventive  Detention  before  the  German Federal Constitutional  Court  and  the  European  Court  of  
Human Rights, 12 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 148 (2012).
The latter’s concerns 
are usually based on the dangers of abrogating basic common law and statutory 
principles concerned with regulating the time between detention and charging 
persons detained with an offense. There is also concern about the propensity 
for  torture  or ill-treatment  in  custody  based  on lack  of  access  to  a lawyer. 
Based on the data above, some the debate seems misplaced, at least as far as 
confessions are concerned. In this study, it seems clear that if a confession is 
going to be made by a terrorist suspect, it is likely to be made in the first 48 
hours of detention—75 percent for oral confessions (Table 7). This suggests 
145.  Nı´ Aola´in, Lawyers, Military Commissions and the Rule of Law in Democratic States supra  note  
106.  
146.  See Charles  Donahue,  Jr., An Historical  Argument  for  Right  to Counsel  During Police  
Interrogation,  73  YALE L.J.  1000,  1034–45  (1964)  (summarizing  the  history  of  the  right  to counsel  





   
 
that efforts to protect the due process rights and to protect access to legal coun-
sel rights for individuals should be concentrated on this first critical period. It 
indicates that state efforts to keep detainees for longer periods on the basis that 
more time produces more confessions has little empirical basis. There may, of 
course, be other rationale for longer detention from the state’s perspective— 
including other forms of evidence gathering and case preparation—but efficacy  
of producing confessions is not one of them.  
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Table 6. Presence of Lawyers and Confessions   
 Confession      
 Oral Written & Oral  None Total    
L. Presence &  




Count  Row  
%    
Row  
%  
Count Col  
%  
L. Present All  Interrogations    12    29%    1    2%    29    69%    42    33%  
L. Present Some  
Interrogations    
0    0%    0    0%    4    100%    4    3%  
L. Not Present    17    22%    1    1%    58    76%    76    60%  
Not known    0    0%    0    0%    5    100%    5    4% 
Total    29    23%    2    2%    96    76%    127    100%  
In  the  period  mapped  here  we  identify  a  discrete  group—9  percent—who  
appear to be subject to more extensive interrogation (Table 7). This group is par-
ticularly significant in terms of international legal regulation, since significantly 
extended detention of these individuals would likely be dependent on derogation 
by the United Kingdom from its international obligations under the International 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human  
Rights.148 
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, and believing that certain 
foreign nationals present in the U.K. were providing support for Islamist terrorist operations, the United 
Kingdom issued an Article 15 (Derogation in Times of Emergency) notice of derogation from its Article 
5  §  1  (Right  to  Liberty  and  Security) obligations.  For  an  in-depth  discussion  of  the legality  of  this 
derogation, see A. and Others v. The United Kingdom, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 137; Marko Milanovic,  
European Court Decides A and Others v. United Kingdom, EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www. 
ejiltalk.org/european-court-decides-a-and-others-v-united-kingdom/. While derogation is, we argue, at 
issue in the extended detention scenario, we note that a significant legal issue in this context is the point 
of judicial oversight.  
In most cases however, detaining the person for an extended period did 
not secure a confession. This data shows only two confessions based upon the der-
ogation, questioning the need for it, if the stated premise is securing confessional 
evidence. This finding (if replicable in other states derogating their obligations to 
enable extended detention) confirms that specialist review bodies such as regional 
human rights courts or U.N. bodies, should pay particularly close attention to the  
practices of states in the context of extended detention. Robust skepticism as to the 
necessity of detention to enable confessions would seem to be in order. 
In multiple jurisdictions dealing with terrorist crime and threats, an important  
normative  discussion  arises  concerning  the  number  of  interrogation  sessions 
which may be necessary in order to secure confessional evidence to aid convic-
tion of a detainee. In this analysis, we particularly focus on the discrete group of 
detainees who are not only being held for extended periods of detention but are 
also being subject to multiple interrogation sessions. A counter-intuitive pattern 
emerges: a discrete subset of 9 percent of detainees are being subjected to 17 plus  
interrogation sessions (Table 8). Walsh’s earlier study found only 2 percent sub-
jected to 16 plus interrogation sessions in what many might describe as the most 
evident military phase of the conflict and where the civilian deaths and casualties 
were higher statistically. 149 One explanation here, noting the later stage of conflict 
and  greater international  attention  on  the  state’s  actions,  is  that  interrogators 
attempted extensive interrogation in order to achieve results that previously may 
have been achieved by intensive, and potentially abusive, interrogation. 150 
On abusive interrogation practices in the jurisdiction, see Report of the Commission of Inquiry 
into Police  Interrogation  Procedures  in  Northern Ireland,  1979,  Cmnd.  9497  (UK)  [hereinafter  The 
Bennett  Report].  On international  attention  to  the  state’s  human  rights obligations  in  the  context  of  
fighting  terrorism,  see,  e.g.,  COUNCIL  OF  EUROPE,  DIRECTORATE  GENERAL  OF  HUMAN  RIGHTS,  
GUIDELINES  ON  HUMAN  RIGHTS  AND  THE  FIGHT  AGAINST  TERRORISM (December 2002), https://polis.  
osce.org/node/4956.
These results indicate some traction to the theory of institutional imprinting, 
and its specific play in the interrogation context. It is notable that there was 
only one confession in an instance where there were 17 plus interrogation ses- 
sions. This outcome questions the effectiveness of the powers granted, and the  
148. 
149.  WALSH, supra note 20, at 65; On patterns of death during the conflict see DAVID  MCKITTRICK  
ET AL, LOST LIVES: THE  STORIES OF THE MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN WHO DIED  AS A RESULT OF THE  
NORTHERN IRELAND TROUBLES (2001).  
150.  
  
legitimacy of their operation on the terms sought by the Executive Branch. 151  
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Table 8. No. of Interrogation Sessions and Confessions   
 Number of Interrogation Sessions       
 1–3  4–9  10–16  171 Total    
Confession  
(s)   
 Row  
%   
 Row  
%    
Row  
%   
 Row  
%  
Count Col  
%  
Oral    15    52%    9    31%    4    14%    1    3%    29    23%  
Written &  
Oral    
0    0%    1    50%    1    50%    0    0%    2    2%  
None    36    38%    41    43%    8    8%    11    11%    96    76% 
Total    51    40%    51    40%    13    10%    12    9%    127    100% 
CONCLUSION 
Our exploration  of  the  trajectory  between  norm  and  exception challenges 
scholarly and policy claims of a one way and highly static relationship between 
these phenomena in situations of crisis, particularly those occasioned by terror-
ism.  Our  data  and analysis  demonstrates  that  there  is  far  more  inter-activity 
between exceptional and  ordinary law  concerning arrest,  detention  and trial in 
democracies managing terrorist challenges than has generally been observed to 
151.  This also from an international human rights law perspective opens up significant questions on 
the necessity for the derogation from treaty obligations. On derogation in emergency, see Fionnuala Nı ´
Aola´in  &  Oren  Gross, From  Discretion  to  Scrutiny:  Revisiting  the Application  of  the  Margin  of 
Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights , 23  
HUM. RTS. Q. 625 (2001).  
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date. This is particularly true of a long-term, low-intensity conflict/high-intensity 
emergency when interrogation, arrest and trial become an integral part of dealing  
with terrorism. What we observe is a process of osmosis between the exception 
and the norm. This results in a “norm” that partly mirrors the legal contours of the 
exception. In short, over time ordinary law and practice absorbs and is modified 
by the reality that an exceptional legal system is operating by its side to manage 
terrorism.  As  this article  demonstrates,  in long-term  conflicts  or  processes  of  
managing terrorism the exception is hybridized to create new norms that embody 
both  the  exception  and  the  ordinary law.  This article  charts  that  ebb  and  flow 
between the normal legal system and the exceptional legal system through proc-
esses of arrest, detention, interrogation and criminal trial. We show that excep-
tionality is accommodated but most importantly that exceptionality and normal 
legal  process  are  not  in  a linear relationship.  The relationships  between legal 
norm and exception in the long-term management of terrorism are neither simple 
nor easily categorized. 
By and large the following conclusions can be drawn. First, the move to excep-
tional (often ill-considered) legal process which generally emerges in the initial 
phase of a democratic state’s responses to terrorism is invariably modified. The 
modification results from the trend toward juridification in democratic societies. 
Democracies have a variable tolerance for outright extra-legality, and courts in 
particular feel the pull of legitimacy and rights-bearing claims which results over 
time to greater legal normality. Second, that tug to the juridic is not linear and can 
result in the extra-ordinary contaminating the ordinary legal system. This process 
of osmosis from the exceptional to the norm can have long-term effects on the in-
tegrity  of  the legal  system,  whereby  norms  created  to regulate  terrorism  are 
absorbed into the regular criminal law in insidious ways. Third, the shape and 
scope of the regular legal process, institutional identity and security sector behav-
ior is shaped and influenced by their long-term interaction with the exceptional 
legal  process.  Most notably  in  the  United  Kingdom  this  is  evidenced  by  the  
Terrorism Act of 2000 (not examined in this study) which absorbed decades of 
exceptional anti-terrorism legislation and now has been woven into the fabric of 
everyday law in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland. 152 
The longitudinal analysis  of  the  dataset  referenced  in  this  study  (circa  400 
cases in tranches from 1988 to 2001), notably points to an increasing juridifica-
tion of the exception over time, suggesting that the law has a centripetal effect 
and supporting what David Dyzenhaus has referred to as a “compulsion to legal- 
ity.”153 That compulsion is not merely an abstract phenomenon but, as we reflect 
here, has practical  and  significant  effects  on  practices  in  the custodial  settings 
which operate as one of the effective front lines on terrorism. In a state with an  
152.  See Christian A. Honeywood, Britain’s Approach to Balancing Counter-Terrorism Laws with  
Human Rights, 9 J. STRATEGIC  SEC. 28, 41–43 (2016) (noting the evolution of the British approach to 
litigation involving terrorism claims).  
153.  David Dyzenhaus, The Compulsion of Legality , in EMERGENCIES AND THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY  
33, 34 (Victor V. Ramraj ed., 2008).  
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ideological commitment to the rule of law, we claim that a strategy of illegality in 
the field of counter-insurgency is unlikely to be viable in the middle to long term. 
If  the long-term  U.S.  experience  with Military  Commissions culminating  in  
their post-9/11 incarnations is compared to the United Kingdom’s experience of 
counter-insurgency tribunals culminating in the Diplock courts, one conclusion 
might be that they show similarities in trajectories of progressive juridification. 
Another might be that Diplock Courts are further along the curve, leading one to 
implicitly question the viability of the military commissions option in the long  
term.154 At the very least our data point to the trajectories that follow in demo-
cratic states when long-term use is made of the criminal justice system to manage  
terrorism. 
Managing terrorism is an enormous contemporary challenge. We observe that 
little sustained empirical knowledge has infused much of the contemporary legal 
and political debates concerning terrorism measures in the United Kingdom, the  
United States and beyond. Contemporary assertions about how to manage terror-
ism abound with untested assertions, and with little more than conjecture on what 
“works,” or what the long-term effects of terrorism legislation might be on the 
rule of law. Our study, while focused on a particular period in a particular juris- 
diction, seeks to pry open some of that untested territory in order to demonstrate 
long-term consequences and effects of counter-terrorism practice and thus chal-
lenge some sacred cows of counter-terrorism orthodoxy. Much more of this kind 
of long-term empirical work in the courts and in detention settings is needed to 
pin down the efficacy, value, and costs of substantially modifying the legal sys-
tem over time to process violent political actors. Ultimately, the positive rule of 
law trajectories demonstrated in this study give us hope, not least because the pull 
to juridification remains strong, no matter the length or substance of challenge to 
the state. In a final salvo, it is worth noting that the conflict and terrorism chal-
lenges  in  Northern Ireland  were  not ultimately  managed  to  a solution  by  the 
courts, nor by military action, but rather by addressing the conditions conducive 
to  terrorism  and concluding  a complex and  contested  peace  agreement  among 
protagonists. This may be the obvious and definitive lesson about managing ter-
rorism successfully. 
154.  The juncture between the war on terror and criminalization/normalization was played out again 
to some extent between 2001–05, resulting again in a decision in favor of the latter as the only effective 
stance  in  the  age  of long-term  ‘neighbour  terrorism.’  See  A  v.  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home 
Department [2004] UKHL 56 (appeal taken from Eng.); Clive Walker, ‘Know Thine Enemy as Thyself’:  
Discerning Friend from Foe under Anti-Terrorism Laws, 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 275 (2008).  
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APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY 
The data set out in the tables are drawn from a survey of 127 cases which com-
prise all those tried in the Northern Ireland Diplock courts in 2000 and in 2001. 
After that period, Diplock trials tapered off significantly. The trial of one individ-
ual is referred to as a ‘case’; several such cases could be tried on one indictment, 
and in each case the defendant typically faced a number of charges. The same 
approach  was  taken  with  the  272  cases  from  1988–89.  The sample  periods,  
January to March 1989 and January to March 1990, were chosen because they 
came before and after the coming into force of the Criminal Evidence (NI) Order 
1988, which severely abrogated the right to silence in Northern Ireland (approxi-
mately equivalent to Miranda rights in the United States), and thus might provide 
some data on the operation in practice of the Order. For the sake of clarity, the 
1988–89 data are not included in this paper’s tables, although the text includes sa-
lient results from analysis of these data. 
For each case,  a  data  sheet listing such variables as  time  of  arrest, place  of 
arrest and other relevant criteria was completed by referring to the ‘Crown Book’ 
and the court files. The authors were given access to these files and had ethical 
and  security clearance  to  undertake  the  research.  Being  common law-based, 
Diplock  court  procedure  is roughly similar  to  that employed  in  U.S. criminal 
courts. The Crown book records such details as the name of the defendant, the 
charges, the plea, the trial judge and the outcome. The court files consist largely 
of a statement of the evidence against the accused. From the police evidence, it 
was generally possible to build up a picture of the arrest procedure and of the 
interrogation process (or at least the police versions of them). In some cases, evi-
dence could be assessed through an examination of forensic reports. This infor-
mation  was  then  coded  (using  a detailed  code  sheet)  and cross-tabulations  
generated using SPSS. 
Much of the data consisted of hard factual material (such as details of charges), 
the collection of which was unproblematic. There were however two elements 
that involved a degree of subjective judgment. The first entailed an assessment of  
the strength of the evidence, other than confession evidence, against the accused. 
This was particularly  important  in  measuring  the  degree  of  dependence  of  the 
Diplock system on confessions. Following Walsh’s Diplock court study (1983), 
the rule of thumb we adopted was that strong circumstantial, identification, or for-
ensic evidence was taken to amount to substantial evidence, while other material 
was considered insubstantial. 
The  second  area  in  which  a  degree  of  subjective  judgment  was involved 
came  in  assessing  the  status  of  the  defendant (‘paramilitary/terrorist-type,’ 
non-paramilitary/criminal, security forces). Examination of the 1988–89 court 
files, particularly of the police evidence, soon revealed that a significant num- 
ber of those being tried were facing charges that seemed to have nothing to do 
with political violence. A typical example might be two defendants who appa-
rently  decided  to  rob  a  chip  shop  with  an  imitation  firearm  after  a  Friday  
night’s drinking binge.  
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This state of affairs came about largely because of the mandatory way in which 
offenses  were channeled  to  the Diplock  courts  at  that  time  (this  was later 
changed). In some cases, the question of status was easy to decide, in others less 
so. Again, following Walsh (1983), the test used was that: 
[I]f the offence was carried out ostensibly for the furtherance of a paramilitary 
objective, for sectarian purposes or by members of the security forces in alleg-
edly countering terrorism then it was classified as political or terrorist. Such 
offences would cover ones of shooting members of the security forces or rob-
bing banks to boost the financial resources of a paramilitary organization. Also 
included,  however, are rioting  and  hijacking  which  in many cases could  be 
interpreted  more  as  mere hooliganism  than  as  being politically  motivated. 
Sectarian  attacks  and  offences  committed  by  the  security  forces while  on 
active duty, such as grievous bodily harm inflicted in the interrogation room 
are also included because they are so closely related to the current violence to  
justify their being treated in this way. If the offence was carried out by the indi-
vidual ostensibly for his own personal gain or gratification then it was classi-
fied  as  ordinary criminal.  . . . It should  be  noted  here  that  the  mere  fact  of 
membership of, or association with a paramilitary group would not, in itself, 
be decisive in this classification. 155  
Where there was some doubt about the matter, this survey tended to err on the 
side of caution by viewing the suspect as paramilitary unless the evidence clearly  
suggested otherwise.    
155.  WALSH, supra note 20, at 16-17.  
***  
 
